

CURRENT *History*

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DECEMBER 1962

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

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January, 1963

NORTH AFRICA

Our January issue focuses on a study of recent events in North Africa and the economic progress of the nations of that area. Seven articles will include:

Rival Political Blocs in Africa

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United Arab Republic

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Morocco

by LORNA HAHN, Research Scientist with the Special Operations Research Office, The American University, and author of "North Africa, Nationalism to Nationhood";

Libya

by H. B. SHARABI, Associate Professor of History and Government, Georgetown University, and author of "A Handbook on the Contemporary Middle East";

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CURRENT History

DECEMBER, 1962

VOL. 43, NO. 256

This is the first of two issues on changing Africa: the economic and political problems faced by the nations of this rapidly developing continent. Here seven specialists explore the factors that contribute to growth in the African states. Our introductory article points out that Nigeria has proved a deserving and "a most promising candidate for American assistance." "... Nigeria is likely to develop a society which incorporates a basic element of social justice if any place in Africa can do so."

Nigeria's National Development Plan

By ARNOLD RIVKIN

*Special Adviser on African Affairs,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*

THE UNITED STATES in December, 1961, translated its statement of intention into being when it pledged assistance of the order of magnitude of \$225 million to Nigeria's National Development Plan even before it was finally drafted and approved by the federal and three regional governments of Nigeria in the spring of 1962.

On the subject of economic aid to Nigeria, the President reiterated the desire of the United States Government to assist Nigeria in its social and economic development pointing out that it was this sincere desire that prompted the sending of a Special Economic Mission to Nigeria last May for the purpose of discussing with Nigerian officials their forthcoming Five Year Plan.¹ The President noted his gratification at the report of

the Mission which speaks highly of the extent to which Nigeria is committing its own resources to well-conceived development plans, its ability to absorb foreign assistance and the sense of social justice that pervades its planning.²

This pledge of aid was the first long-term commitment made by the United States anywhere in the world under the new aid criteria announced by President Kennedy in his foreign aid message to Congress of March 22, 1961. It is also the largest single economic aid commitment made to date by the United States to a country in Africa south of the Sahara.

What are the economic, social, and political factors in Nigeria which led the United States to make this precedent-making commitment? What are the principal features of the new Nigerian six-year development plan which so highly commended it to the United States? In the ensuing sections we shall attempt first a brief *tour d'horizon* of the Nigerian scene,

¹ The plan, conceived as a 5-year plan at the time of the visit of the Special Economic Mission, was revised and promulgated in final form as a 6-year plan.

² Joint Statement of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Balewa on the Occasion of His Visit to the United States, July, 1961.

and then a summary statement of the principal aspects of the Nigerian development plan, from the vantage point of the Special United States Economic Mission to Nigeria, referred to in the foregoing quotation from the Joint Statement of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Balewa of July, 1961, which played a principal role in the United States decision to make its historic commitment to the Nigerian development plan.³

THE NIGERIAN SCENE

The over-all impressions of the Special United States Economic Mission to Nigeria presented by the leader of the Special Mission in his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the International Development and Security Act in June, 1961, seem a good starting point for the brief *tour d'horizon* of the Nigerian scene in the post-independence period. The Mission leader set out the impressions in these words:

The mission came away from Nigeria with three very vivid overall impressions. First, there is a remarkable determination and dedication among the Nigerians to get economic development. It is very impressive. This is a society very responsive to economic incentives and it is a society that in one way or another is determined to get economic development and improved standards of living for all of its people.

Second, the Nigerians work very, very hard. They work hard in agriculture; they work hard in transportation, in trade, and commerce and, in fact, in almost any aspect of life one could observe. A great deal of the energy is wasted and directionless. Nevertheless, the energy is there to be channeled and harnessed to economic development purposes.

Third, Nigeria still has the vital momentum of its recently achieved independence. This is very important to the Nigerians. It is very fresh

in their minds and they are quite determined to couple economic development with political independence to achieve what they would consider a complete independence.⁴

The leader of the Special Mission then went on to examine the Nigerian polity and economy in light of the new aid concepts of the President. The four new concepts offer a convenient classification for looking at Nigeria and are employed in the following paragraphs. The concepts are long-term planning, absorptive capacity, self-help and social justice.

LONG-TERM PLANNING

Nigeria, perhaps more than any other country in Africa, has an experience in planning which is impressive. Like all British colonies in Africa, starting in 1945, Nigeria had a 10-year "development plan." It was a primitive plan, which more or less reflected the structure of the colonial administration in terms of grouping of projects to reflect the different departments established by the British government in Nigeria, without reference to the structure of Nigeria's society or its economy. Nevertheless, the Nigerians learned some valuable lessons. They learned that ten years is too long a period to try to plan. They learned that planners could not just group projects together and expect that somehow they would be geared together. They learned that to be successful a plan had to correlate the productive sectors of the economy with the social overhead sectors.

In 1955, with the advent of internal self-government in two of the three regions—namely, in the Eastern Region and Western Region—these two regional governments put into practice the lessons they learned in developing new 5-year plans. The Northern Region followed suit but to a lesser degree altered the format of its first plan. In the Western and Eastern regional plans an attempt was made to correlate the productive sectors of the economy with the social overhead sectors, and a concerted attempt was made to generate income in the private sector, which would expand the tax base of the economy for future development financing.

³ The Special U.S. Economic Mission made a second visit to Nigeria during October–November, 1961. After both visits the Special Mission rendered official reports which were cited in the Presidential Determination to make the long-term aid commitment to Nigeria. The present author was the leader of the Special Mission on both visits to Nigeria.

⁴ Testimony of Arnold Rivkin, Leader of Special U.S. Economic Mission to Nigeria, *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 7372, The International Development and Security Act, Part III, June 26, 1961, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C.*

With independence in October, 1960, the Nigerian federal government decided to attempt over-all planning for the entire nation by creating a developmental framework for all three regions and the federal government.

In April, 1962, the Federation of Nigeria launched its National Development Plan, 1962-1968, "a national framework for development" to correlate in principle and integrate in practice the four development plans of the federal government and the three regional governments. Under the constitutional division of powers the federal government and the regional governments have the responsibility and authority to develop and carry out economic development plans within their respective jurisdictions. The regional authority coincides with the geographic limits of the regions. The federal authority extends to the federal capital of Lagos, and also to federal functions bestowed by the constitution irrespective of regional boundaries, *e.g.*, construction of the Niger Dam, federal roads, railway development and port facilities.

The Nigerians formulated their plan with outside aid. They had five American economists provided by the Ford Foundation and an Indian economist provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in addition to a small corps of capable Nigerian economists. The planners went through a sophisticated exercise attempting an over-all plan which covers not only the public sector, but also the private sector of the economy. The plan delineates planning objectives, attempts to quantify economic targets, sets economic priorities, and seeks to shift emphasis in the development scheme of things from the social and infrastructure spheres to the productive sectors, stressing agriculture, small industries and manpower training. The planners also attempted to train more Nigerian economists in the craft of planning; small groups of young Nigerian economists were associated with all of the development planning.

In African terms, Nigeria's experience with long-term economic planning equipped it for a major effort. Its present plan is the equal, and in its scope and conceptualization

probably ahead, of any other on the continent.

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

With respect to the second of the President's aid concepts, the absorptive capacity of a country—the capacity to receive and utilize productively significant amounts of capital, including external assistance and private investment—Nigeria ranks high on the African scene.

Nigeria has a public service which is hard to equal in the new states of Africa. By and large it gives promise of being able to mount and administer development programs of significant magnitude. The best of the public services is to be found in the Western Region. There the public service has been substantially Nigerianized; *i.e.*, it is staffed almost entirely by Nigerians with the exception of some of the professional and skilled technical jobs.

The Eastern Region probably comes closest to the Western Region and is in process of Nigerianization as is the federal government. The one part of the country which lags in this respect is the Northern Region. There attempts are being made to catch up, but it is likely to be some years before the Northern Region achieves the level of staffing and quality of performance of the other regions.

Nigeria's institutional problems are perhaps the most serious limitations on its absorptive capacity. Nigeria needs channels for funneling funds into the productive sectors. In agriculture, which is the basic sector of the economy, Nigeria does not have an adequate system of agricultural credits and, as is the case generally in Africa, has a very poor system of agricultural extension work. In the industrial sector, which is assuming increasing importance in Nigerian planning, there are not at the present time satisfactory channels for investing money; *i.e.*, the lending institutions, development corporations, advisory services, and information and statistical services are not adequate to the growth envisaged in the development plan. The important thing, however, is that the Nigerian plan reveals a sharp awareness of these prob-

lems. In the development plan, correcting and developing institutions to meet these weaknesses are given high priority.

To ascertain absorptive capacity, one must also look at the size of the economy of Nigeria. It is the second largest economy on the African continent, second only to the Republic of South Africa. Its gross domestic product last year was over \$3 billion. Its growth rate over the last 10 years in constant prices averaged between 3.8 per cent and 4 per cent per annum. Its gross fixed capital formation over the same 10-year period averaged 11.5 per cent of gross domestic product per annum. In 1960, the gross fixed capital formation reached the rather impressive level of 15.5 per cent.

The structure of the economy, too, offers insight into the probable absorptive capacity of a country. Nigeria is rather unique in Africa in terms of having a variegated agricultural base, not a one-crop economy. It has palm oil and kernels, cocoa, groundnuts, coffee, rubber, cotton, and is now developing several other agricultural commodities. It also has a growing internal food production.

Nigeria also has commercially exploitable resources of tin and columbite, and is one of the few countries in tropical Africa with coal deposits which are being commercially exploited. Recently Nigeria had two important petroleum discoveries in the Eastern and Western Regions. A growing output of crude oil is now being marketed, and a new refinery is being constructed at Port Harcourt which will satisfy Nigerian needs and provide a surplus for export. A potentially valuable by-product, supplies of natural gas, has also been discovered.

In addition, Nigeria has one of the better transportation grids in tropical Africa. It has a reasonably good basic road system and it has a reasonably adequate rail system, both of which are to be developed under the new plan. It also has an expanding construction industry and is developing a cement capacity internally. Finally, Nigeria has an adequate power potential, evidenced by its coal, petroleum and natural gas resources as well as by its hydroelectric potential. In fact

the largest single project in its development plan is the \$200 million Niger Dam project.


SELF-HELP

In terms of the third concept of the President, self-help, Nigeria appears determined to mobilize its human and material resources behind its development efforts. In fact, one reason why Nigeria will need considerable external public assistance for its new development plan is that most of its development to date has been largely self-financed, financed out of savings from the sale of export crops. Nigeria has run down its reserves, particularly in the last four or five years, in order to finance its internal development.

Nigeria is also determined to educate its people in order to better their standard of living, as well as to increase their contribution to the development of its economy. Nigeria has reached the remarkable point in the Eastern and Western Regions of spending between 43 and 45 per cent of the ordinary regional annual budgets on education. In fact, this is one of the major problems Nigeria now has to face. It is spending a substantial part of current revenues on education. It needs an expanding economy not only to maintain this level of expenditure on education but to absorb the school-leavers being produced. Nigeria is increasingly being confronted by a growing problem of unemployment among young primary school-leavers.

Nigeria is also in the process of decolonizing its economy. It is in process of transferring its low-yielding investments, held primarily in the United Kingdom, back to Nigeria. It has created one of the first stock exchanges in Africa and has had three or four rather successful stock issues. It has introduced a fiduciary element into its currency rather than requiring 100 per cent backing in sterling. It has established a central bank.

In the field of taxation Nigeria has a long way to go. It needs to improve the structure, coverage and efficiency of its tax system. Nevertheless, in underdeveloped country terms, Nigeria's tax performance is perhaps



better than most. It has accepted the principle of a graduated income tax and is attempting to apply it in two regions and federally in the difficult circumstances of faulty statistics and limited economic data. Some measure of the tax performance of Nigeria is afforded by the fact that in the last two or three years, tax income has been the equivalent of about 10 per cent of the gross domestic

product. In underdeveloped area terms, this is impressive.

In the field of saving Nigeria also has a long way to go, particularly with respect to voluntary saving. But this is typical of underdeveloped areas. Yet with the start of the short-term money market and a long-term bond market, Nigeria has the rudiments of a savings system. Nigeria has also recently es-

tablished a national football pool, which, interestingly enough, should account for an income of some £2 to £3 million per year.

Regarding the final concept of the President, social justice, Nigeria, like all new states, has its problems. It is concerned with four major tasks: state building, nation building, economy building, and a technological revolution. Each of these tasks is difficult; together they are formidable. Nevertheless, the Nigerian emphasis on economic development is intended to help meet all four tasks simultaneously. Therefore, economic development is thought of as a way to pull more and more people out of the subsistence economy and into the market economy where reward is based on performance rather than status.

Economic development is viewed, too, as a technique and means of bridging the tribal, cultural and sectional differences which characterize all the newly independent African states. Finally, economic development is recognized as the key to financing the technological revolution which Nigeria is about to embark upon and which is indispensable to creating employment opportunities to absorb the growing number of young people that are now coming out of school. The first products of the almost universal primary education in the Eastern and Western Regions started to come out this past year and numbered 100,000 people. This is a large number of people for the Nigerian economy to absorb constructively each year.

Nigeria has one of the largest private sectors, and perhaps the largest, outside of the Republic of South Africa, on the African continent. There are a large number of Nigerian entrepreneurs, particularly in transportation and in commerce and trade. Nigerians are also beginning to go into small industrial undertakings on an increasing scale. The new Nigerian development plan, as we shall see in the following sections, emphasizes the growth of the private sector; this should benefit a growing segment of Nigerian society.

The stress on agriculture in the new development plan almost automatically insures that it will affect the economic status of most Nigerians. It is estimated that about 75 per

cent of the population is engaged one way or another in agriculture. Thus, improvement in agriculture is likely to benefit the largest segment of society.

In addition, all three major political parties in the country are committed to the goal of improving the living standards of the large number of people in the country. It is important to realize in this connection that in Africa generally, and in Nigeria particularly, the Asian and Latin American pattern of a small landed ownership class controlling the political and economic power of the country with a large landless group working the land is the exception rather than the rule. The problem in Africa is one of traditional and ancient tribal land tenure systems which need to be modernized if productivity is to be increased and living standards improved. Nigerians are aware of the need and are experimenting with a variety of land ownership and use schemes in an attempt to find a way to modernize land uses without entirely disrupting traditional ownership patterns.

Finally, in the goal of education for everybody, one finds in a sense the Nigerian answer to social justice for its people. Nigeria is attempting to improve everybody's status, including that of women, through approximating universal primary education and expanding secondary and university educational opportunities. Education of women has long been neglected in African society, both as a tribal custom and as a colonial practice, and Nigeria's decision to remedy this long-time neglect is evidence of its determination to use education as a tool to achieve social justice throughout society.

In the political domain, too, Nigeria is seeking social justice. Nigeria has a bill of rights entrenched in its constitution and an independent judiciary to apply the rule of law. This concern for individual and minority rights is all too rare in Africa. In addition, Nigeria has one of the few independent trade union movements and free presses on the continent.

For all of these reasons, the Special Economic Mission believed that Nigeria is likely

to develop a society which incorporates a basic element of social justice, if any place in Africa can do so. In sum, the Special Economic Mission concluded that Nigeria with its democratic framework and its determination and capacity to achieve economic development was not only eligible but a most promising candidate for American assistance under the development aid concepts announced by the President.

PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF PLAN

The statistics used in this discussion are for convenience rounded out, but are of the right order of magnitude and approximate the actual numbers used in the Development Plan. The new Nigerian Six-Year Development Plan has a total over-all magnitude of approximately £1.1 billion.⁵ This total is composed of planned investment in the public sector of approximately £650 million, and of anticipated investment in the private sector of approximately £425 million to £450 million.

The Nigerian Development Plan is, as we have already noted, in effect four plans—a federal plan and three regional plans—encompassed in a national framework of development. Hence, the estimate of public sector investment of £650 million is made up of planned investment at the federal level of approximately £400 million, of planned investment in the Northern Region of approximately £90 million, in the Western Region of approximately £85 million, and in the Eastern Region of approximately £75 million. The total contemplated private investment is composed of anticipated foreign investment of approximately £225 million to £250 million and approximately £200 million of domestic investment.

The over-all contemplated per annum growth rate for the economy during the plan period is set at about 4 per cent. This contemplates an annual investment rate equal to approximately 15 per cent of the gross domestic product. As we have seen, the

Nigerian economy reached this investment rate in 1960, and the contemplated growth rate of approximately 4 per cent per annum is consistent with and an approximate continuation of the per annum growth rate over the decade, 1950–1960.

The composition of investment in the public sector provided for in the plan represents a sharp shift in emphasis from the earlier pattern of investment in the preceding development plans. It is estimated, for example, that approximately 75 per cent of the planned investment in the public sector can be catalogued under the heading of economic development investment, as compared with a somewhat similar cataloguing of expenditures in the immediately preceding plan period of approximately 50 per cent under this heading. The shift represents a sharp reduction in the allocation of resources to social overhead and administrative investment expenditures.

Generally speaking, the priorities set by the national framework for development and reflected in all of the four plans encompassed by it may be formulated in the following order: (1) development of the agricultural sector; (2) development of the industrial and trade sector; and (3) development of manpower resources, with particular attention to the education and training of skilled and technical personnel.

Within the agricultural sector there is a wide variety of projects and programs, including development and training of personnel for extension services, basic and applied research, development of settlement schemes and plantation agricultural schemes (*e.g.*, the plantation “satellite” scheme in the Eastern Region), experimentation with new crops and rehabilitation of existing crops (*e.g.*, palm rehabilitation in the Eastern Region), development of agricultural credit systems, development of food production for the internal market, development of fishing resources (*e.g.*, offshore fishing, lake and river fishing, and pond fishing), study of forest potential and possible reforestation, and a general over-all survey of the national agricultural potential.

⁵ The Nigerian pound has the same value as the British pound, \$2.78 to \$2.82.

The industry and trade sector includes a variety of projects, too, ranging from the establishment of industrial estates designed to attract external private investment, to the establishment of a development bank for funneling public funds into the private sector, to industrial advisory services to offer free advice to Nigerian entrepreneurs seeking to start new small industrial undertakings. There is also the possibility of direct public investment in private sector projects, *e.g.*, the provision of approximately one-third to one-half of the investment in a petroleum refinery by the federal government, and a possible federal government investment of some magnitude in a contemplated integrated steel plant.

In the manpower development field the major program encompassed in the development plan is essentially the implementation of the Ashby Commission Report on Education, with particular emphasis on the training of skilled and technical personnel.

In the public sector, the major project, as we have noted, is the Niger Dam Project, which is presently under study by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The estimated cost is set at this time at approximately £68 million to £70 million. The dam is intended primarily for the generation of hydroelectric power, but is expected to have secondary benefits involving possible improvement of river navigation and agricultural development from the point of view of irrigation. The I.B.R.D. has requested some additional studies with respect to the cost of the project and the comparative costs of thermal-generated power. These are now under way and are likely to be available in the near future. There are also supplementary power projects involving thermal generation of power during the period the dam is being constructed, which might be suitable as a supplementary source after the dam is completed.

In the transportation field, there are several port development projects in the plan as well as proposals for railroad development. These include laying of new tracks, modernization of existing installations and equip-

ment, and acquisition of new rolling stock. There is also a proposal, already alluded to in passing, for the establishment of a development bank. The International Finance Corporation presently has this proposal under study. There are, of course, other projects and programs in the public sector, but the foregoing outline sets out the highlights and provides an insight into the range and types of projects included.

The Nigerian government contemplates defraying from its own resources all of the costs of its regular recurrent budget and the additional recurrent costs to be induced by the Six-Year Development Plan. In addition, it contemplates the financing of approximately two-fifths of the cost of the capital investment in the public sector under the development plan, *i.e.*, about £250 million. Performance of this scope by the Nigerian government would mean an increase of approximately 50 per cent in the mobilization of its internal resources over the present level. This would mean increased taxation and public saving, and internal borrowing at a substantially increased level over the present level. This would also suggest the need after allowance for shortfalls in carrying out the contemplated public sector expenditures of the plan of up to £75 million for external assistance of the order of magnitude of some £325 million.

In the private sector the contemplated investment of £225 million to £250 million of external private investment anticipates an
(Continued on page 368)

Arnold Rivkin recently joined the Development Advisory Service of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as Special Adviser on African Affairs. For almost six years he has been director of African economic and political research at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies and wrote this article just before taking up his new duties. He is the author of the recent book, *Africa and the West*, and of the forthcoming book, *The African Presence in World Affairs*.

"... The problems of a multi-racial society with different cultural levels overshadow everything else in South Africa." This analysis of the Republic evaluates economic progress and the development of an autonomous government in the Transkei, which South African leaders believe "is the only alternative to a multi-racial state of the Central African Federation type, with all of its resultant problems."

The New Republic of South Africa

By COLIN RHYS LOVELL

Professor of History, University of Southern California

A YEAR after the establishment of the Republic of South Africa and its departure from the Commonwealth neither jubilant hopes nor dire fears have been realized. The realities remain the same; *la plus change, la plus même*. After a flurry of capital investment, causing the government to impose exchange restrictions, the South African Reserve Bank during the first six weeks of the new regime increased its gold and foreign assets by \$25 million, and South African government bonds remained firm on international exchanges.

A threatened overseas boycott of South African goods never materialized; and trade with Great Britain, the United States and Sweden rose sharply, with Canadian trade holding at pre-republic levels. By early 1962, the government was planning to relax exchange controls, but in a manner to encourage South African overseas investments to repatriate themselves so as to underwrite enlarging domestic industry, which has made South Africa the chief industrial nation of the entire continent.

While the bulk of foreign capital in the republic has remained British, some £900 million, such American firms as General Motors, Phillips Petroleum, and Coca Cola have increased their South African commit-

ments; and by the close of 1961 the Anglo-American Group easily floated a \$30 million loan among American investors. The government has made much of its Japanese trade agreement, which has facilitated ISCOR pig iron export and increased the flow of Japanese consumer goods into the republic; but this treaty has meant an addition, rather than a supplement, to pre-republic trade.

The major exports (in terms of revenue) of South Africa—gold, uranium oxide, and platinum—have never depended upon Commonwealth membership, going chiefly to the United States. South African membership in the Sterling bloc continues; and to the benefit of meat and wool farmers both the South African and British governments regard the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, which guarantee certain products of each country preferences in the other, as being also apart from Commonwealth membership. Either government may denounce the arrangements on six months' notice; significantly neither has done so. While South Africa was unable to remain in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, it has replaced it with a separate agreement with the United Kingdom giving nearly the same benefits.

"Commonwealth relations" for South Africa have always meant those with the United

Kingdom, and these have remained close. The Simonstown Defense Agreement of 1955 remains intact, so that the republic is obligated to furnish bases for the Royal Navy and RAF in time of war, even though South Africa is neutral, a status of probably very brief duration considering the treaty obligations. Negotiations on other subjects have been very easy, with the republic interestingly not raising the issue of the British Protectorates, whose very existence now depends upon South African forbearance. This, however, is likely to continue. Legislation by the two Parliaments, effective May 31, 1962, put the results of the negotiations into law. While the citizens of each country became aliens in the other on that date, until the end of 1965 South Africans in certain categories may become British citizens by merely registering this intent, rather than by the slower naturalization process. Thus any South African descended in the male line from persons born in British territory may so signify, as may also those South Africans in the British crown service, employed by private British companies or societies, or serving international organizations of which the United Kingdom is a member.

This legislation permits dissatisfied English South Africans to depart easily, but beyond some well-publicized expatriations, few have done so. Private company figures and government plans for hydroelectric development of the Orange River, harbor improvements at Port Elizabeth, and a new atomic reactor near Pretoria indicate a prosperity which the English share largely. Conditions of living in South Africa are very good for the English, who would have difficulty duplicating them in British territories.

ELECTION, 1961

The republic meant that the Nationalists had achieved their basic purpose. Capitalizing on the jubilation of his followers, and possibly recognizing that the cohesive force of republicanism will no longer be available to the party, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd went to the country, although the Assembly had nearly three years to run. In the result-

ant election in October, 1961, one of the dull-est in recent years, the Nationalists did not contest 46 seats, while the United Party did not challenge the government in 50 others.

The Nationalists, against the background of the troubles in the Central African Federation, Angola, the Congo and Kenya, promised to keep South Africa "white." The United Party promised little vaguely and exerted most of its energies against the secessionist Progressives, who took 11 seats with them when they broke with the U.P. in protest against its "me-too" racialism in 1959. United Party election efforts retrieved 10 of the seats, including that of the able parliamentary veteran Harry Lawrence; but Mrs. Helen Suzman retained Houghton on the Rand for the Progressives.

The Nationalists won an easy victory, gaining two seats at the expense of the United Party. The fact that both seats lost by the United Party were for "English" constituencies made their loss harder. Its alliance with the National United Party of "Japie" du P. Basson, whose political career has now come full circle from United Party, to Nationalists, to alliance with the U.P., did that party no good in rural Afrikaner districts and cost it a sure seat, which it had to give to Basson, the only N.U.P. candidate elected. The only thing of interest in the election was the surprising strength of the Progressives. They secured nearly one-tenth of the votes cast by Europeans who found at least interesting the moderately liberal program of the party, with its echo of "equal rights for all civilized men." Although spread too thin to elect more than one candidate, the size of the Progressive vote indicates a substantial dissident group among Europeans. Since the Assembly elections, however, the Progressives have failed to follow through with victories in smaller constituencies where their strength is more concentrated, either in contests for the Transvaal Provincial Council or even for the Johannesburg City Council; and the party has no strength in the Orange Free State or Southwest Africa.

Nevertheless, the showing of the Progressives raises speculation that the 1961 elec-

tion may have been the last one fought on traditional lines. With the constitutional issue out of the way, the English-Afrikaner political division will lose much of its old meaning, and the basic issue of racial policy may produce a recasting of party lines. The very success of the Nationalists has made their slogan of Afrikaner solidarity less meaningful, and their appeals to Afrikaners as the "have nots" have less utility as Afrikaners have moved into urban professions and business and have shared in the general prosperity. Western Cape Nationalists, always the most moderate, have thrown out overtures to the English, and the Nationalist branch at Vasco took the unheard of step of adopting an "English" candidate, who was unopposed in the election. Soon after the election, Verwoerd ended the monolithic Afrikaner character of the government, which has existed since 1948, by naming two English South Africans, whose racial ideas were similar to his own, to the cabinet. For their part, the English element, disgusted with the fecklessness of the United Party, and generally disturbed by the Progressives, may yet find that Verwoerd and company have virtues hitherto unsuspected, particularly since the bulk of the English have no enthusiasm for racial equality, even for civilized men.

The election results made the government sufficiently sure of the political future so that early in 1962 it reversed its 1948 policy by announcing plans for large European immigration to build up the white minority. Within the Nationalists, however, the Cape section has revived the old Hertzog plan of political integration for Europeans and the 1,500,000 Coloreds, largely in the Western Cape, to give a broader base for "Europeans," and incidentally to strengthen the position of the Cape Nationalists. The very victory of the Nationalists has permitted the reappearance of the long Nationalist tradition of a younger man challenging the established party leadership as being too "liberal." As Hertzog faced Malan, and Malan, Strijdom, so now Verwoerd must consider his Minister of Justice, B. J. Vorster.

Vorster drove through the Sabotage Act

of 1962, whose stringency surpasses any previous legislation for dealing with dissent. Concerned with the sizeable body of European dissent and particularly the failure of the mass treason prosecutions in 1961, Vorster drafted the law and held off any modifications of it. Widely defining sabotage, *inter alia* the advocacy of any political, economic, or social change, as well as conduct "embarrassing state administration" (that is, passive resistance), the statute provides for trial by a single judge, who upon a finding of guilty may impose either sentence of death or five years imprisonment for South African citizens and expulsion for aliens. In addition, the Minister of Justice is empowered to "detain" persons suspected of "sabotage" for one year and to "ban" people almost as he will. Once under a ban, a person may be forbidden to communicate with anyone or to receive visitors; and no statement, written or oral, of such a person, whether made before or during his period of ban, may be repeated or reproduced in any manner, even after the ban has been lifted. Dissent is to be silenced.

SABOTAGE AND CENSORSHIP

The press provisions of the measure legalize censorship by requiring any new publication to deposit \$30,000 with the government, which will be forfeited should it subsequently fall under the displeasure of the Minister of Justice. The press control features of the law produced severe criticism from the English papers, so that *Die Transvaaler* was able to rally doubting Afrikaners to support the measure by equating the opposition with "anti-Afrikanerism."

However, the influential *Die Burger* was clearly unhappy. The promise by Vorster not to invoke the press measures against major news organs have done little to quiet fears. Recent South African history is replete with ministerial promises to invoke broad powers only against extremist dissent, only to have them applied to moderate disagreement. Hard on the heels of the passage of the bill, Vorster announced his intention of banning the vigorously anti-Communist liberal *Contact* and the *New Age*, along with

the *Johannesburg Post*, an African tabloid. Chief Albert J. Luthuli had barely returned from Stockholm with his Nobel Prize (bitterly resented by many South African Europeans) when he was placed under the government ban. In terms of the Sabotage Act nothing Luthuli has ever said may ever be repeated in any form or manner.

FOREIGN POLICIES

The appearance of new nations in "black" Africa has concerned the republic, whose defense expenditures have risen sharply the past three years. The 1962 defense estimates were over 100 per cent higher than the previous year. The Minister of Defense, J. J. Fouché, justified the increase to the Senate as necessary to defend the country against the "military action openly advocated and secretly planned" by the Afro-Asian states in the United Nations. Fouché's statement caused such a flurry that a week later in the Assembly the Prime Minister felt it desirable to deprecate his remarks by putting the increase in terms of South African participation in the cold war, although he warned that the country had to be on guard against boasters who might seek to carry out their boasts.

At the same time the government sought to improve relations with the United Nations, despite the bitterness felt by all Europeans about the denial by the General Assembly to Foreign Minister Eric Louw of a chance to reply to the Afro-Asian attack on South African racial policies. That 1961 session saw the usual committee established to visit Southwest Africa. The Pretoria government promptly refused admittance to the committee as implying a derogation of South African sovereignty over its fifth province. However, in April, 1962, Louw and Verwoerd did invite the chairman, Victorio Carpio of the Philippines, and the vice-chairman, Salvador Martinez de Alba of Mexico, to visit Southwest. Their very mild joint communiqué at the close of the visit, wherein they denied that the Republic's forces in the terri-

tory were a threat to international peace and utterly ignored the application of apartheid in the former mandate, produced protests at the U.N. that the two men had been gulled by the usual "official" tour. Matters became more confused when Carpio, after leaving South Africa, disclaimed "personal responsibility" for the communiqué—whatever that meant.

As expected, the Afro-Asian bloc has returned to the charge at the 1962 General Assembly session, but this time Louw has been permitted to reply. On September 24, 1962, he goaded the members of the Afro-Asian group with their own shortcomings, particularly the seizure by India of Goa, to the fury of Krishna Menon. U.N. attitudes toward South African racial policies remain hostile, which increases European support for them in the Republic.

THE TRANSKEI: BANTUSTAN

Perhaps hoping to soften international criticism, but also to satisfy some of his own supporters, in March, 1961, Verwoerd with great fanfare resurrected the old SABRA¹ ideal of Bantustan and its partial recognition in the Tomlinson Report (both of which had been buried by Strijdom "baaskap"). He announced that except for defense, foreign affairs and justice, the Transkei was to have complete self-government and the attributes of nationhood found in its own flag and anthem, the popular *Nkosi Sikela Afrika*.

Verwoerd, a one-time member of SABRA, has thus chosen to implement its Bantustan theory in the oldest and most homogeneous native reserve, whose 16,000 square miles include an Indian Ocean shore and a population of 1,500,000 Xosa, 17,000 Europeans, and 14,000 Coloreds, the latter two groups to be without political rights in the territory after its independence. Verwoerd has emphasized that this drastic "solution" is the only alternative to a multi-racial state of the Central African Federation type, with all of its resultant problems. The Prime Minister has also indicated that the plan for the Transkei is but the initiation of a program for seven or eight similar Bantustans, each resting on

¹ South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleenthede).

a single tribe, although of lesser size than envisaged by either SABRA enthusiasts or the Tomlinson Commission.

The Transkei has a long tradition of semi-autonomy, and in May, 1961, its advisory Territorial Authority, composed largely of government-named chiefs, accepted the principle of self-government at the urgings of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Daan de Wet Nel, and named a committee to negotiate with the government on details of the plan. Simultaneously the government launched a five year program of \$160 million for Bantu development, largely to be expended in the Transkei for 81,000 rural homes, irrigation for 12,000 acres, and soil conservation.

The full plan will go into effect early in 1963, when the Transkei will be tied to the Republic of South Africa only by the reserved powers, which are also those retained by the United Kingdom in its plan for an "independent" Basutoland, where universal suffrage will elect 9 district councils, which in turn will name half of the National Council, the other half to be chiefs and officials. However, the constitution for the Transkei has made a very great departure from all previous SABRA and official plans by dropping tribalism completely as the basis of government. Instead, a full-blown cabinet government, responsible to a parliament elected by universal suffrage, will administer all the transferred powers.

The Transkei plan has been praised as a "new day" and damned as a total fraud. It is both and neither. The very effort of the government to make the Transkei a show window commits it to a very different policy than in the past. The chiefs through whom the government has ruled have been dropped in favor of a new élite of some 250 university graduates, 3,000 teachers, and 600 clerks—more of each category than in the entire Congo. The future Prime Minister of the Transkei, Kaizer D. Matanzima, while a chief, is also a university graduate and has announced that after independence there will be no apartheid in his country for any race and that the first goal of his government will

be to secure complete control over the administration of justice. In its anxiety to prove its sincerity to the world, the South African government may find itself yielding to this demand.

Critics of the plan form two groups. One, represented by the now-banned *Contact*, denounces the scheme as taking care of a mere tenth of the overwhelming Bantu population and not touching at all the real problem of urban racial relationships. Another group, however, contends that the Transkei plan marks the beginning of the end for European control of South Africa. Particularly vehement have been the English Natalians, who fear that the large Zulu population will demand what the Xosa have received. Within the Nationalist party there are murmurs that Verwoerd has become "liberal," and the moderate *Die Burger* says that no one can tell what the new approach will mean for Europeans in the way of labor, markets, land and government. In this last connection there have been rumors that the Prime Minister would not be unwilling to have the Transkei represented in the United Nations in the manner presently enjoyed by the Ukraine!

The real problem for the over-grazed and eroded Transkei will be economic viability. No South African government can pour money indefinitely into a region where the Bantu have complete control. Verwoerd has softened his opposition to European investment in light industry along the Transkei borders, but how far private European venture capital will venture into a Bantu state is yet to be seen. Transkei export-import trade must necessarily move through South African ports, unless the republic is willing to lay out enormous sums for dredging Port St. John on the Transkei coast.

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Discussing the problem of continuing instability in the Republic of Congo more than two years after its independence, this specialist observes that the Congo may prove crucial to the viability of the United Nations. "No one can predict what the ultimate significance of the Congo can be for the United Nations if no solution is found; the very future of the international organization may be at stake just as the League of Nations foundered over an African question in Ethiopia in the 1930's."

The Republic of Congo

By HARRY R. RUDIN

Professor of History, Yale University

MORE THAN two years have passed since the Republic of Congo was created, but the hope that a strong and united state would be established has not been fulfilled. Under the circumstances such a result was hardly to be expected in so short a time. In our Western world the unification of states, a major theme of its history, was a process that required generations of time despite the many favorable factors encouraging the union of peoples into national states—common language, common religion and economic forces that could not operate successfully without a unified state possessing common weights, measures, currency, rail gauges, laws, and so forth. Although cultural, political and economic forces were so powerful that they could overcome the obstacles that confronted them, the attainment of unification was nevertheless a time-consuming and difficult task.

In Africa, where unification has become the dominant problem for the governments of newly independent states, most of the favorable factors that existed in Europe are absent. People are divided by tribes, by language, by religion; there is no large and powerful group of businessmen to press for economic and political unity as in the case of Europe. The only unifying factor in African states has been

that of opposition to a ruling colonial power. Beyond that one has only division.

The only unity possessed by the Belgian Congo before independence on June 30, 1960, lay in the word "Belgian." The territory had 40 large ethnic groups, of which 20 are major ones; and the spoken languages were many. When political parties were first formed in early 1960 in anticipation of independence, their number was more than 200; and they were largely tribal in character. Although Patrice Lumumba headed the only political party that called itself national, the National Congolese Movement, his chief support came from the area around Stanleyville, a region to which he sought to flee for a comeback to power after his ouster from the government in the fall of 1960. In the elections of that year, Lumumba's party won only 33 seats in a total of 137. The opposition to his extremist rule came from men like Kasavubu, whose Abako party in the fall of 1960 favored a federal form of government for the Congo. The separatist movements in Katanga and in South Kasai were those of tribal groups—they desired no strong unitary state like that sought by Lumumba. Largely because Lumumba sought Communist support, neither the United States nor the United Nations were ready to lend him the aid for the sub-

jugation of Katanga that he wanted in 1960. Because of Lumumba's pro-Communist views, it was possible at that time to detect a certain sympathy in the West for the separatism that appeared in the Congo.

Efforts were made during 1961 to solve the problem of separatism. In March, political leaders met in Tananarive, where Tshombe of Katanga succeeded in getting the principle of a loose confederation accepted for what might be in the neighborhood of 20 provincial states in the Congo. In April, a conference was held in Coquilhatville to implement this agreement. It failed. Kasavubu, the head of the Congolese government, now favored a centralized state. He turned against Tshombe's federal scheme, and even had him arrested and imprisoned for two months. The task of forming a government was later given to the parliament that had been elected in 1960. It met in July. To the surprise of most observers, Cyrille Adoula was made premier; and Antoine Gizenga, who had got himself recognized as Lumumba's successor and had been working to create a separatist state in Oriental Province, became Deputy Vice-Premier. He was careful, however, in succeeding months not to appear in Leopoldville to perform the functions of his office, preferring to operate from the base he had in Stanleyville with the support he got from a number of foreign governments that recognized him as head of a sovereign state.

Now that a government had been formed, the effort was made to compel Tshombe and Katanga to submit to the central Congolese government. The United Nations and the United States, which had opposed Lumumba's efforts in this direction, gave their support to this cause. Despite the invasions of Katanga in September and in December, 1961, and despite the Kitona agreement that terminated the second invasion, nothing substantial was really achieved because the terms of that agreement were not carried out.

One of the unhappier results was that the United Nations had now become deeply involved in the Congo, where Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was killed while on a mission to make peace with Tshombe. The

18,000 armed men of the United Nations are costing the international organization \$10 million a month, far too much for the small budget needed for normal operations. A serious split has developed among members of the United Nations over the Congo policy. It was over the Congo issue that the United Nations acquired its most serious problems—financial bankruptcy, the selection of a permanent Secretary General, the hostility of the Communist bloc. No one can predict what the ultimate significance of the Congo can be for the United Nations if no solution is found; the very future of the international organization may be at stake just as the League of Nations foundered over an African question in Ethiopia in the 1930's.

PROBLEMS FOR ADOULA

In 1962, it was necessary for the Adoula government to carry out the commitment made in 1961 that Katanga would be reintegrated into the central Congolese government. But as the weeks and the months of the year went by, the political and economic problems facing Adoula have become worse. In 1961 the government had a deficit of \$176 million; for the current year the deficit will be even greater, \$232 million. Four-fifths of the central government's expenditures go into the salaries of civilian and military personnel. The government is not in a solvent position to concern itself with its most important economic problems. The number of unemployed people in Leopoldville has been placed at 70,000—some say even 100,000. The resulting discontent accounts undoubtedly for the growing crime rate of the city as well as for the increasing political opposition to Adoula. Criticism has been directed against the 43 ministers and secretaries of state that composed the over-sized cabinet of Adoula and against the high salaries and perquisites of office-holders. Workers are demanding pay increases. People seem to be turning more and more to the extremist supporters of Gizenga despite the fact that he has been put under house arrest and has had his parliamentary immunity removed. Gizenga has been moved away from Leopoldville because

of the demonstrations on his behalf in the capital city.

In April, 1962, there was a general strike against the government of Adoula, who had to use threats and force to suppress it. The Premier closed down the workers' official headquarters in Leopoldville and prohibited the publication of the city's leading newspaper. But some concession had to be made to the growing discontent. The number of ministers and secretaries of state was reduced to 28; and Adoula had to reproach these and other officials for corruption. To assure himself of his hold on the government, the Premier got rid of extremists in high places. There were signs in the late fall of 1962 that his radical political opponents were merging their forces into something like a common front against Adoula and his pro-Western policies. Fears have been repeatedly expressed in the west that the fall of Adoula may lead to a radical government in the Congo and a deviation from Adoula's pro-Western commitment. There seems to be support for the statement of President Kennedy that time is running out on Adoula.

The most powerful reason for the effort to incorporate Katanga into the central Congolese government is economic. Under agreements made before the granting of independence, the Belgian government pledged itself to hand over to the Republic of Congo revenues that had come to the former colonial administration from its holdings in the companies exploiting the resources of the territory. Since these resources are in Katanga, where they are exploited by the *Union Minière du haut Katanga*, and since Tshombe is in control there, these revenues have not gone to the central government. The latter, now supported by the United States and by the United Nations, wants a share of the taxes and royalties now being taken entirely by Tshombe.

It is said that the latter got \$40 million in revenue from this source last year. A decree of the Katanga government requires the *Union Minière* to deposit these funds in the bank of Katanga to the credit of the government. *Union Minière* must even deposit all

foreign earnings in Katanga, to provide Tshombe with funds needed for foreign mercenaries and for the arms of his well disciplined army estimated at 11,000. The mining company has been put in a difficult position because, while it announced a dividend this year, the announcement was accompanied by the statement that no funds were available since they were sequestered in Katanga. The company has made clear its willingness to pay funds to the central Congolese government if suitable arrangements can be made. For some time it has been hoped that the repair of a bridge destroyed in October, 1961, may permit the transportation again of Katanga minerals through Leopoldville to Matadi, a route that would enable the central government to collect needed export duties.

THE UNION MINIERE

While President Kennedy and others state that the *Union Minière* is an obstacle to the peaceful solution of the Congo problem, it needs to be recognized that this company, controlled by British, Belgian and French capital, finds itself in a most difficult position. One of its officers has said that the company cannot choose its own tax-collector. It has been confronted with actual threats from Tshombe to its properties should it turn over to Adoula the revenues now going to Katanga. These properties are scattered over an area of 6000 square miles; they include 1000 miles of power lines, 600 miles of roads and 300 miles of railway. Over 100,000 people, workers and their dependents, receive their support from the company. Its schools, hospitals and houses are essential to the people of Katanga. It is much easier for Tshombe to harm the *Union Minière* than it is for the United Nations to protect it from harm as the organization has promised to do in return for 50 per cent of the revenue now going to Katanga.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, as Tshombe has indicated, if all the revenue coming from *Union Minière* went to Leopoldville, it would not suffice to balance the budget of the needy republic. This income of \$40 million—\$50 million a year could not pos-

sibly meet the needs of a budget that had a deficit of \$176 million in 1961 and one of \$232 million in 1962. Even Tshombe's smaller budget finds the revenue paid by *Union Minière* inadequate. What the Republic needs is something approaching the value of the total mining out-put of one year, which amounted to \$274 million in 1959.

At the present time the central Congolese government needs aid from abroad. In addition to its United Nations contributions the United States has given over \$50 million in assistance and \$16 million in surplus foods to the Congo. Aid coming from Belgium is said to amount to \$60 million in 1962. Belgium has 2,300 technicians in the Congo, of whom 1,400 are teachers. This Belgian contribution needs to be recalled by those who know only that Belgium, like France and the Soviet Union, has refused to contribute anything toward the support of United Nations forces in the Congo.

Efforts have been made during the first half of 1962 to arrive at a solution of the problem by direct talks between Premier Adoula and Tshombe. Despite the advice of friends who reminded him of his arrest and imprisonment by Kasavubu at the Coquilhatville constitutional conference in 1961, Tshombe went to Leopoldville to discuss issues with Adoula. To prevent any repetition of that episode, Tshombe, wisely, it turned out to be, sought and received assurances from the United Nations that he would be protected during his stay in the territory of those who regarded him as a mortal enemy. One effort was actually made to prevent his return to Elizabethville, the capital of Katanga, but the United Nations came to his aid. The talks started on March 15 and lasted until April 16; they were later renewed, until a final breakdown came on June 26.

After the first break in April, Adoula appealed to the United Nations for a tougher mandate to liquidate the secession of Katanga. He demanded the total reintegration of the state into that of the republic of Congo; he wished to do away with Katanga's army, stamps, currency and flag. In a mood of determination, Adoula persuaded his parliament

to deprive Antoine Gizenga of his immunity so that he could be punished for his separatist activities in Oriental Province.

With the final breakdown of talks in late June, the United States and the United Nations decided that the settlement of the issue could be postponed no longer. Adoula and members of the Leopoldville government came out in favor of strong action, while proposing the drafting of a federal constitution to replace the temporary constitutional device of the *loi fondamentale*. On his trip to Europe to win support for the plan that was being developed, U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, stated in England that the Congo crisis had to be finally solved; he said he would try to persuade *Union Minière* to divert revenue from Katanga to the central government. The Secretary General's patience and sense of tact burst its oriental barriers in Finland, where he referred to Tshombe and his supporters as a bunch of clowns.

President Kennedy had also come to the conviction that strong action was called for. There were rumors that the United States and some allies might compel Tshombe to accept federation; the State Department denounced the Katangese leader and threatened economic pressure and measures short of war if he persisted in secession. G. Mennen Williams, responsible in the State Department for African Affairs, hurried off to Belgium on a special mission. Here, as in England, there was solid opposition to the use of force and of economic sanctions against Katanga despite agreement with the goals of the new policy. The United Nations representative in the Congo, Robert Gardiner, a Ghanaian, flew to New York on a quick trip to confer with U Thant. The United States ambassador in the Congo, E. A. Gullion, was summoned to Washington for high-policy discussions.

The rumors and the speeches and movements of important political figures during July indicated that the hour of decision had come, with the United States assigning itself the principal role in what was assuming the character of a final, almost desperate, drive

for a solution of the Congo problem. It was the United States that worked out the new plan for dealing with the situation. Belgium and Britain were consulted; both agreed with the goals of federation, shared revenues and merged armed forces, but drew the line at the proposal for economic pressures like the boycott of copper and cobalt or the cessation of all trade. The principle of federation had been accepted by both Adoula and Tshombe, and steps were already taken to draft a constitution with the aid of United Nations experts. The United States insisted on economic and other sanctions to compel acceptance of the plan for settling Congo's difficulties. It was here that Britain and Belgium declined to follow the American lead. Their objections, however, did not curb the United States determination to proceed. The cooperation of other states was sought; that of Germany and of Italy seems to have been obtained.

After drafting this program for positive action, the United States submitted it on August 9 to U Thant, saying that the next move was up to him and to the United Nations.¹ The Secretary General had already appealed to all members of the international body for cooperation against Katanga. He now discussed the program with the Advisory Committee on the Congo; information about the plan was reported to the Security Council. The latter, however, had been deliberately by-passed, supposedly to keep the Soviet Union out of the matter. The plan was thereafter sent to Gardiner in Leopoldville for communication to Tshombe, who was given ten days to reply, the deadline being September 4. Tshombe was warned of the trade ban and other measures that would follow his refusal to accept the goal of the plan for federation, the sharing of revenues, and the amalgamation of armed forces.

PRESSURES ON TSHOMBE

In the meantime pressure of various kinds were already being applied. The Congo Republic imposed a ban on air traffic over Ka-

tanga. Except for United Nations planes, all planes scheduled to land there had first to make a landing in Leopoldville. Businessmen operating affairs in the republic and in Katanga were warned that they must choose one or the other—they would not be allowed to do business with both. There was talk in Leopoldville of cutting Katanga's communications with the outside world. In retaliation Tshombe imposed restrictions on the food and fuel coming from Rhodesia for United Nations forces.

Tshombe's delay in replying to U Thant's demands worried the authors of the tough new policy. At the end of August, the United States succeeded in getting Britain and Belgium, along with Italy and Germany, to urge the acceptance of the proposals; carefully omitted were all references to anything like sanctions. On the last day of grace, September 4, Tshombe gave a favorable reply: he accepted the terms in principle. He asked that United Nations experts be sent to Katanga to work out ways and means for dividing revenues and for merging armed forces. On that same day the United Nations transported into Katanga a battalion of Congolese troops, a move that caused Tshombe to fear that a Congolese attack was being mounted against him. Gardiner explained that the troops were completely under United Nations command, not that of Leopoldville. The fear remained, however, that a third war against Katanga was imminent.

This program for action against Katanga had been worked out without consultations with the Security Council, where the Soviet Union would have had an opportunity to

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¹ For the text of the U.N. Plan on the Congo, see p. 366.

"If . . . further attempts continue to perpetuate the Federation . . .," warns this observer, "Central Africa will become a vortex of chaos and violence indeed." Unhappily, "whereas the Federation cannot continue for much longer . . . the alternative has not yet become generally clear."

The Dissolving Federation

By KEITH IRVINE
Former Editor, Africa Weekly

Like the mythical "zombie"—a living corpse animated by occult power in the service of its owner—the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland continues temporarily to extend its unhappy existence. With all the marks of death upon it—an unrepresentative government, internal dissension among the white minority still in power, a public debt that has risen to \$900 million, repressive legislation, increasing hostility of the African population and a consequent record budget expenditure on "internal defense"—the Federation continues to function. It is still alive because the United Kingdom, which created the Federation in 1953 by an order in council made under an Act of the British Parliament,¹ is experiencing difficulty in facing the problems that would be raised by its dissolution. In short, whereas the Federation cannot continue for much longer (some observers cite the end of 1963 as the latest possi-

ble date), the alternative has not yet become generally clear.

The United Kingdom is the country that is ultimately responsible for the Federation, and which is therefore ultimately responsible for the foreign policy and defense of the Federation. Under British law² a conference to review the federal constitution had to be held not later than 1962. In an atmosphere of gathering crisis, Britain, in 1960–1961, called constitutional conferences not only for the Federation, but also for Northern and Southern Rhodesia. (Nyasaland's right to self-government, and later independence, had already been accorded in principle.) All three conferences, however, adjourned without reaching satisfactory solutions.

In March, 1962, Sir Roy Welensky, white prime minister of the Federation, increasingly conscious of the deteriorating political situation, called federal elections in an effort to gain strength. He emerged weaker at the polls than ever before. The elections were boycotted not only by Africans (most of whom were not entitled to vote in any case), but also by the white liberals, and even by those Europeans (presumably most of South African origin) who prefer Afrikaner racism to the Rhodesian variety. Consequently Welensky could only muster 15,000 votes all told—representing less than 0.2 per cent of the total population of 8,510,000. Miraculously, however, largely owing to the personal support of

¹ The *Africa Bureau* of London states: "As this Act is a United Kingdom statute, Parliament at Westminster has the sole and exclusive constitutional power to repeal this law. There is no doubt that, even if the Federal Assembly passed a law or motion to the contrary, the British Parliament has the power to revoke the authority from which the Federal Constitution stems and thus the constitution itself."

² Under Article 99 of the 1953 Act of Parliament the review conference had to be convened within not less than seven or more than nine years. The conference was in fact convened in December, 1960. However, Article 99 does not provide for the conclusions of the conference being brought into effect within nine years.

Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, as well as to the support of some of the mining companies of Southern Africa, whose interlocking empire stretches from Katanga down to the Rand (one of the great concentrations of financial power in the world),³ Welensky continues in office. In this respect it is of interest to note that in 1961 Welensky's Federal Government received a loan of \$14,280,000 from the Anglo-American Company Ltd.—which, despite its name, is a British-South African concern, like the British South Africa Company, which in the same year lent the Welensky Government a further \$11,200,000. Rhodesian Selection Trust, Ltd., however, which has American connections, did not make any loan.

So closely, indeed, is Welensky identified with the Federation that should he leave office the Federation would lose its central focus. If this should happen the United Kingdom would be in the acutely embarrassing position of reaching a decision about how to meet the Federation's public debt. Britain's Minister for Central African affairs is Mr. R. A. B. Butler—like Lord Home a personal friend of Sir Roy Welensky. When Mr. Butler's advisers visited Central Africa earlier this year they discovered that out of the total public debt of \$900 million, only \$138 million is the direct responsibility of the three territorial governments. These governments argue that if (or rather when) the Federation is dissolved, the remaining sum—\$762 million—is a liability which must be accepted by the United Kingdom. Not unnaturally, however, the United Kingdom is unwilling to assume responsibility for such

an astronomical sum, and it is this unwillingness which appears to be the major obstacle to the dissolution of Federation.

Meanwhile, as political pressures escalate into violence within the Federation, those who favour democracy and independence for the three component territories point out that, whatever is eventually done about the federal debt, to support four governments instead of three in the meantime is hardly a measure of economy.⁴ This seems evident apart from the mounting military and security expenditure that is required to continue to coerce the African populations, who from the beginning have clearly manifested their total opposition to both Welensky and Federation.⁵

With American sources urging support for democracy in Central Africa, and with certain Anglo-South African mining interests urging support for Welensky, Macmillan's Conservative Cabinet (in which both Lord Home and R. A. B. Butler appear to support the Welensky position in differing degrees) finds it difficult to come to any decision—above all one which would result in informing the British electorate that a \$762 million debt has been incurred on their behalf. (The Labour Government's responsibility for the abortive Tanganyika groundnut (i.e., peanut) scheme, which cost the British taxpayer about \$72.8 million, is still remembered).

The situation of the British Government, therefore, may be compared to that faced by the French in the earlier stages of the Algerian crisis: France was called upon to take rapid and agonizing decisions. When these decisions were postponed, France itself was swayed by the waxing influence of a colonial minority. In the absence of definite action by Britain, the recent links between the British Fascist movement and the Republic of South Africa, which at present merely evoke a fleeting if sardonic smile, might well prove disturbingly prophetic of the shape of things to come.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

The constitutional situation in each of the

³ The African populations affected do not enjoy the protection of anti-trust laws, such as those operating in the United States.

⁴ In 1962 there were some 36,500 members of the federal civil service of whom 14,000 were Europeans. Most of these civil servants have been employed on a permanent pensionable basis.

⁵ Federal expenditure on defense in 1961 amounted to over \$22 million although in 1955 the amount budgeted was under \$10 million—i.e., the figure has more than doubled in the past six years, despite the fact that the Federal Government has no responsibility for defense outside its borders. The \$22 million is therefore entirely devoted to internal security.

three territories—should Britain bring herself to end Federation—is the following. In North Rhodesia a new constitution was announced in February, 1962, under which elections were due to be held in October, 1962. (N.B: At the time of writing—October 1—the elections were set for October 30). It was generally expected that the principal African leader—Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.)—would win these elections.⁶ (Forty-five seats are being contested, and a modicum of interracial support is required for each candidate to succeed.) Kaunda's victory would strengthen the movement towards African independence. In October or November, the British planned to convene a constitutional conference for Nyasaland, in which Dr. Banda, African leader of the Malawi party of Nyasaland, would participate. Nyasaland already has self-government and a Malawi majority in the legislature, and it is generally supposed that the discussions would be concerned with the date of independence. Banda has made it clear that Nyasaland does not intend to remain within the Federation under any circumstances. (The name of Nyasaland is to be changed to "Malawi" after independence.)

It is in Southern Rhodesia that the situation is the most difficult. The greatest number of Europeans live in Southern Rhodesia⁷; the federal capital, Salisbury, is there. Prime Minister Welensky was also born a Southern Rhodesian. After the Southern Rhodesian

constitutional conference adjourned in deadlock in the spring of 1961, a referendum was held among the white population in July, 1961, as a result of which a new constitution was introduced on December 6, 1961. The constitution is strongly weighted in favor of the white minority. Elections due to be held under this constitution have been postponed until 1963. The African political parties have rejected the December 6 constitution and have announced a total boycott of any elections held under it.

In June, 1962, the United Nations passed a resolution requesting Britain to convene a constitutional conference with the participation of all political parties. This would result in the introduction of a constitution that would ensure the rights of the majority of the people on the basis of the principle of "one man one vote." This the British have not done. Neither the British government nor the South Rhodesia European administration, headed by the territorial prime minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, have shown any sign of abandoning the December 6 Constitution.

Instead the Southern Rhodesian Parliament has passed some of the most repressive legislation in the world, notably the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1959, and the Law and Order Maintenance Act of 1960, to which certain even more repressive amendments have been added. The principal African political party, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (Z.A.P.U.)⁸ was banned in September 1962, after which over 1,000 Africans were arrested, and widespread violence was reported. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Z.A.P.U., who was abroad at the time his party was banned, has returned and has been restricted to the area of his Natal village. The banning of Z.A.P.U. produced two reactions at the United Nations. Firstly, the General Assembly passed a resolution urging Britain to release Nkomo and other imprisoned leaders, and to secure the lifting of the ban on Z.A.P.U. Secondly, Sir Hugh Foot, the United Kingdom representative on the Trusteeship Committee, resigned because of his disagreement with the present United Kingdom policy towards South Rhodesia.

⁶ The *London Observer* stated "authoritatively" on August 4 that Mr. Harry Nkumbula, president of the African National Congress (the rival to U.N.I.P.) had received over \$98,000 from "sources in Elisabethville," Katanga, since January, 1962. It was also alleged that over 260 Africans from North Rhodesia had been smuggled into Katanga for military training, after which they would return to North Rhodesia as assassins. The Katangese were said to have drawn up a "death list" of over 100 persons in North Rhodesia, including Mr. Kaunda.

⁷ In 1961 there were estimated to be 221,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, and 2,900,000 Africans. In the same year there were estimated to be 74,000 Europeans and 2,400,000 Africans in North Rhodesia. In Nyasaland there were 2,870,000 Africans, and only 8,600 Europeans.

⁸ Southern Rhodesia is to be named "Zimbabwe" after independence.

WELENSKY'S FUTURE

Whereas the African nationalists have made a number of semi-humorous suggestions as to Sir Roy Welensky's personal future after the eventual dissolution of Federation (the Malawi party has offered him a post as engine driver—his original job—in an independent Nyasaland; the North Rhodesian Africans have stated that he will become a prohibited immigrant after independence, and have suggested that Britain grant him the title of "Lord Kariba" so that he can sit in the House of Lords—no doubt recalling that his predecessor, Sir Godfrey Huggins, became Lord Malvern; other sources have suggested that he might enliven the Australian political scene), the question of what will become of the federal prime minister after the Federation is dissolved is one that will have to be decided.

Sir Roy is of Jewish-Afrikaner origin, and is the son of parents who trekked from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia. He has, however, shown no inclination to confine his future activities merely to Southern Rhodesia, but on the contrary has demonstrated every inclination to retain his post as federal prime minister by keeping the Federation alive by hook or by crook. Hitherto the support of some influential British Conservatives and of British-South African mining interests have been sufficient to do this. As, however, even these forces combined will not suffice in future to keep the Federation alive, Welensky has been seeking further governmental help beyond the federal boundaries. Most Western governments accord him only a qualified degree of support. His 1962 threat to "use force" and every means at his disposal against attacks designed to break up the Federation "in an unconstitutional way" (which followed his statement that Britain could not dissolve the Federation except at the request of or with the consent of the Federal Government) aroused considerable disapproval in London. But he has found the type of unqualified support he is seeking from two foreign governments: the administration of Portugal's Dr. Salazar, now engaged in colonial war in

Angola, and the administration of Dr. Verwoerd's Republic of South Africa. Both of these governments, like Sir Roy's federal administration, share an antipathy towards democracy, towards the United Nations, and towards African nationalism: forces which, they feel, threaten their governmental existence.

It was suggested in the press in 1961 and by Mr. Kaunda in 1962 that the three governments had entered into a secret defense agreement. The South African Government has denied that this is so. Welensky has also denied this, pointing out that the Federation cannot legally enter into such an alliance without British consent. On another occasion, however, Welensky stated that the Federation is entirely responsible for its own defense. Whether or not any secret military alliance exists, close military cooperation has been observed in practice. Welensky has also—with or without British agreement, and it is generally presumed to be with—entered into a close de facto alliance with Moise Tshombe in Katanga. Military movements reported across the North Rhodesia-Katanga frontier led to a request by United Nations Secretary-General U Thant in December, 1961, that United Nations observers might be posted along the frontier. This request was refused by Sir Roy, who went on to state, with reference to United Nations efforts in the Congo: "The corruption of the United Nations ideals by a clique of members has been brought out into the open."

Not all the financial interests concerned in the area are, however, unreservedly in favor of Sir Roy. Whereas together the main companies operating in Central and Southern Africa, which are joined together by a system of interlocking directorates, are worth some \$5 billion (i.e. more than 25 times the entire federal budget for 1961-1962), in practice these companies are divided on policy. Generally speaking it would appear that the British, South African, and Belgian interests have favored continuing support for Welensky, Tshombe, Verwoerd and Salazar; the American interests tend to favor support for African independence, at least for North Rho-

desia, as the best gauge to determine future stability.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Gradually mobilizing against the Welensky position, however, are the majority of the governments of the world through the agency of the United Nations. As a result of the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples—the famous Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960—a Special Committee of 17 was established, and has been considering the world's remaining colonial territories one by one. The Committee has recommended that the United Nations General Assembly as a matter of urgency fix a date for the independence of North Rhodesia; and has noted with regret that Britain has not yet taken steps to transfer all powers to the people of Nyasaland, while welcoming the decision to hold talks between the leaders of Nyasaland and the United Kingdom government. At the time of writing South Rhodesia is under consideration at the United Nation's seventeenth General Assembly, because the situation in the territory has deteriorated rapidly since the United Nation's June, 1962, resolution received a dusty answer from the British cabinet.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

As already indicated, the inter-relationship between economics and politics is such that the first essential step towards making the three territories economically viable would be the establishment of representative governments, so that the increasing burden of expenditure for coercion can be slipped from the shoulders of each administration. In Nyasaland this has virtually occurred. In South Rhodesia, however, the contrary is happening. In August, 1962, the United Kingdom loaned South Rhodesia \$9,800,000 to help solve "transitional problems." A substantial proportion of the loan is to be devoted to road-building—with obvious military implica-

tions—and to establishing additional quarters for 500 African policemen in rural areas. The banning of the principal African organization, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) has also served to narrow still further the chances of a peaceful and orderly evolution of the situation, thus reducing still further the chance of expenditure on constructive projects.⁹

Presuming, however, that the political deadlock will be broken, and that the question of the federal public debt is ultimately faced, what will be the economic situation of each of the three territories? Will they prove economically viable even when the burden of federal expenditure and of excessive "security" outlay has been lifted?

In this respect it is worth noting that there appears to be no intention on the part of any of the interests concerned to abolish such essential common services as railways. Consultation among responsible officials would also be held for customs, postal services, and higher education. The possibility of financial links, for example through the agency of a Central Bank which would take over the reserves of gold and of foreign assets of the Federation, and which would back a common currency has also not been discounted. The African leaders have stressed their desire to continue certain common services, and there has been talk of establishing a special commission for the purpose, presumably on lines somewhat similar to those of the East African Common Services Organization.

Originally, in the mind of the planners of Federation, each of the three territories had a particular role to play:—North Rhodesia, with its wealth of copper, would provide the primary industrial infrastructure; South Rhodesia, with its larger white population, was to provide the terrain for the development of secondary industries; Nyasaland would be further developed as an agricultural area, and would also provide a source of labour for the other two territories.

The assignment of "roles" is, of course, oversimplified in that it only relates to the dominant economic activity projected for each territory. Agriculture is pursued in such

⁹ *The Central African Examiner* for September reported that a loss of confidence in South Rhodesia was now apparent on the London stock market.

areas of North Rhodesia as Barotseland and the Northern Province, and the smaller secondary industries in both North Rhodesia and Nyasaland have grown at the same rate as has secondary industry in Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless the fact that revenues derived from North Rhodesian copper have been used for the benefit of South Rhodesia has caused strong dissatisfaction among both the Europeans and the African nationalists of North Rhodesia. South Rhodesia also relies in part upon tobacco growing, coal mining, and the production of asbestos, whereas in Nyasaland tea growing and tung production have been important elements in the economy, while Nyasas work not only in the North Rhodesian mines, but also down on the South African Rand.

North Rhodesian copper remains, however, the foundation of the federal economy. In 1961, the total copper production of North Rhodesia was worth \$338,472,114, out of a total mineral production in the territory worth \$339,143,255—a figure which dwarfs the present North Rhodesian budget, which balances revenue and expenditure at approximately \$56,000,000. By contrast, South Rhodesia and Nyasaland are “soft” territories, which are economically liable to polarize around the most convenient focus. North Rhodesia, however, like Katanga to which it is geologically allied, is itself an economic polarization point—one of Africa’s economic bases upon which future development will be built.

At a time when continental and inter-continental economies are developing, even if we are not yet approaching a world economy, it is of interest to know into which larger context the Central African territories in general, and North Rhodesia in particular, will fit. There would appear to be three possibilities. Firstly, they might be associated with the European Common Market. Secondly, they might continue to be involved, as they now are, with the Katanga-South African complex without being associated with the European Common Market. Thirdly, they

might be linked with an African economic grouping (the African Common Market).

With respect to the European Common Market it will be recalled that Sir Roy Welensky has expressed his desire for association with the Market, to which North Rhodesia’s copper would be an asset. In this he is backed by some influential Britons, although the recent death of Lord Robins has deprived him of a major supporter. The European “Six,” however, have shown considerably less enthusiasm, for the disadvantages of the Algerian crisis are too fresh in the minds of all concerned for them to take lightly any decision which might result in a similar problem. A recent British news despatch, dated Brussels, stated that Britain was being discreetly informed that “the Federation should be asked not to apply for associate membership” in the European Common Market, as its application from the point of view of the Six “would be embarrassing in view of the United Nations resolution on African advancement in Southern Rhodesia,”¹⁰ and would “provoke violent protest from African states.” In a word, admission of the Federation would weaken European chances of associating other African states with the Market.

The second alternative—continuing the alliance of the Federation with the Katanga-South Africa complex—is the one presently being followed. The dissolution of Federation, and the advent of majority (African) rule in North Rhodesia would not necessarily mean any departure from the pattern, although certain variations would appear possible. The success of the white supremacists in using Tshombe as a stalking horse in the Congo is likely to be followed by similar attempts elsewhere in Africa, and it would not be surprising to find Nkumbula attempting to play Tshombe at Kaunda’s expense in North Rhodesia. Should he in fact attempt this, and should he be successful, a further lease of life would be granted to the present economic association. Prime Minister Welensky is reported to be considering a plan to replace agricultural Nyasaland with Tshombe’s mineral-rich Katanga within the Federation.

¹⁰ U. N. Resolution 1747(XVI), June 28, 1962.

Tshombe as president and Welensky as prime minister would allegedly give the new "Federation" a greater multi-racial semblance.

The third alternative would presumably be followed if an orthodox African nationalist administration came to power in North Rhodesia, and if Federation were then dissolved. North Rhodesia would then, when transitional problems had diminished, cooperate with other independent African states within a larger economic grouping that would seek to achieve for Africa what the European Common Market seeks to achieve for Europe. The precise relations between individual African states would then be determined by negotiation. Nyasaland, to name but one example, has close affinities with East African territories, and these would have to be taken into account.

But for any of the three individual territories to attempt to stand entirely alone would appear to be out of the question. Speaking of independent African states in March, 1962, President Nkrumah of Ghana stated categorically: "Three possibilities are open to us: to look to each other and pool our resources, to look to one or other of the foreign powers and become dependent upon them, or to isolate ourselves and regress." Long economic perspectives into the future were also opened up by Dr. Banda's statement to the Portuguese Association of Nyasaland in the same month of March, 1962:

I don't mind telling you that I am interested in Portuguese ports, and not only in Beira, but Quelimane and others. . . . If the Portuguese will not allow me to ship goods through their territory, I will go to Dar es Salaam.

¹¹ In 1960 the average earnings of a European in the Federation were \$6,385, whereas the average African earnings were \$239.

¹² Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, formerly the U.N.'s chief representative in Katanga, has commented: "Almost everyone outside South Africa regards Dr. Verwoerd's regime with well-founded abhorrence. Relatively few people, however, have much fault to find with the system prevailing in Rhodesia, although the uncontroverted facts . . . make it clear that the underlying realities in both cases are similar, and that Sir Roy Welensky differs from Dr. Verwoerd on tactics rather than on principle. Any moral difference there may be would tell in favor of Dr. Verwoerd, who is at least honest about what he is doing."

A glance at the map, however, will show that Nyasaland needs Mozambique's ports, and that for years to come will have no alternative but to use them. There is no direct rail link between Nyasaland and the other two territories of the Federation. The two Rhodesias have relied in the past on the port of Beira also, reached by rail through Bulawayo; they also have the choice, however, of the line which runs through Katanga to the Angolan port of Lobito. Eventually it may also prove possible to use the Congolese port of Matadi: a development that, in the years to come, may not be without significance, especially if a reconciliation is effected between Katanga Province and the Central Government of the Congo.

In conclusion it may be said that the three territories of Central Africa could best demonstrate their viability if (1) the Federation were dissolved; (2) if each territory became an independent state with a representative government based on universal suffrage; (3) if the states were then permitted to concentrate upon developing their economies in a form of association with each other, and with other independent African states; (4) if each state could secure access to a seaport without fear of interference or blackmail.

If, on the other hand, further attempts continue to perpetuate Federation; if Europeans continue to be paid 26 times as much on the average as African workers;¹¹ if accumulated wealth is needlessly squandered upon coercion and upon sabotaging African efforts at self-improvement; if new Tshombes are sought and financed with a view to pitting African against African so that whites may continue undemocratically to dominate the area,¹² then

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Keith Irvine has observed at first hand, since 1954, the developments at the United Nations affecting the African states. Formerly editor of *Africa Weekly* and *Africa Today*, he has contributed to *Collier's Encyclopedia*, the *Washington Post*, *The Nation*, *The New Leader*, as well as *Current History*.

Although "the ultimate nature of the African economy seems more puzzling and more remote than ever," this specialist feels that it "seems increasingly clear . . . that the future African economy will not be an imitation of the nineteenth century English system of factory towns built on coal and iron nor will it be an imitation of American suburbia. . . ."

The Brazzaville Twelve

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AS AN old rural adage tells us, "It's the squeaking wheel which gets the grease." In Africa the states which make a noise may not get greased, but at least they get noticed. This is true of the Belgian Congo, Angola, the Central African Federation, South Africa, Kenya and elsewhere, while in French Black Africa, other states, not noticeably well-greased, are moving forward on the road of progress quietly and largely unnoticed.

The newly de-colonized states of French Black Africa do not particularly object to the lack of attention they have drawn. They are fully aware themselves that they are moving, and in political, if not in economic matters, they are quite clear as to the direction they are headed.

If you ask well-informed citizens of the Brazzaville Twelve (and there seem to be a surprising number of the inhabitants in this category), they may tell you, "1960 was the last year of the struggle for independence; 1961 was the first year in the struggle for inter-African cooperation." It is certainly true that the French colonial system fell apart, much faster than anyone expected, in the four years 1956-1960, and it is equally true that the new system of cooperation may be assembled in the four years 1961-1965. It will be a strange system, quite different from the political outlook of nineteenth

century European nationalism and reflecting, instead, a hierarchy of political allegiances and activities much closer to the Germanies of the late medieval period.

The impetus for independence and de-colonization was so powerful in 1960-1961 that it carried French Black Africa well on the road toward that Balkanization of Africa which the Africans themselves feared. The first example of the power of this impetus, Guinea's refusal to stay within the French community, led to bitter feeling and mistaken actions on both sides, by mutual retaliation through total severance of the French connection. This was subsequently recognized, by all concerned, to have been a mistake but has stood as a valuable example of the impulsive actions to be avoided by other states in the future.

The French constitutional law of June 4, 1960, which changed the French Community into a contractual association, was implemented by a series of Accords of Cooperation over the following 13 months. These were completed for tropical Africa on July 19-21, 1961, when the French Assembly ratified the last five of these, with the four states of the Conseil de l'Entente (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, Volta) and Mauritania. All of these remained outside of the Community and one (Volta) remained outside the French defense network. In most cases there were

nine accords, establishing cooperation with France in defense, assistance, economics, monetary and financial arrangements, justice, education and culture, postal and telecommunications, civil aviation, merchant marine, and exchange of technical personnel. The variety between these is so great, however, that some states are within the Community, while others are outside it, some are within the European Economic Community (at least as associates), while others are not, and in general, groupings and relationships are varied and changeable.

Since French relationships with the former African colonies are now regulated by these numerous accords, no real distinction is made between members or non-members of the Community and most of the organs of the Community (such as the Court of Arbitration, the Senate of the Community, and its Economic and Social Commission) were ended or suspended by July, 1961. The Interparliamentary Consultative Senate of the six Black African States still in the Community does not meet, and the President of the Community (who is also the President of France) has a ceremonial and symbolic role less significant than that of the Sovereign of the British Commonwealth.

REALIGNMENT

This process of disintegration was still moving, when the opposite process of reintegration through cooperation began. As a consequence, the relationships of the independent states of French Black Africa are now regulated by literally hundreds of agreements which are in various conditions of viability. Only a few can be mentioned here.

In the first year or so of the realignment process, it seemed that tropical Africa might organize itself into two opposing groups. On the one hand, the Ghana-Guinea Union of May, 1959, was expanded, with the accession of Mali, in July, 1961, into the pompously named Union of African States (U.A.S.). On the other hand at Brazzaville in December, 1960, ten French states of western Africa joined the Cameroon Federation and the Malgache Republic to form the

Union of African and Malagasy States (U.A.M.S.). At Casablanca in January, 1961, the U.A.S. created rather tenuous links with Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and the Algerian Provisional Government.

Four months later, in a five-day conference in Monrovia, the U.A.M.S. formed a more stable and homogeneous grouping of twenty, by adding to the Brazzaville twelve, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya (which had previously been at Casablanca), and Tunisia. Within the Brazzaville Twelve are two other major political alignments: (a) the Council of the Entente of Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, and Volta; and (b) the Equatorial Bloc, which came into existence at Bangui, June 22, 1961, when the fifth conference of the former French Equatorial states (Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic, and Chad) was expanded by the addition of Cameroon.

Of these and other alignments of African states, the U.A.M.S. is the most hopeful. Its chief manifestations are its summit conferences which assemble the chiefs of the twelve states, every March and September, in a different host city and under a different president. The conferences have been:

Preliminary Conference at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, October, 1960; First Conference, Brazzaville, Congo, December 15-19, 1960; Second, at Yaounde, Cameroon, March 26-28, 1961; Third, at Tananarive, Madagascar, September 6-12, 1961; Fourth, at Bangui, Central African Republic, March 25-27, 1962; Fifth, at Libreville, Gabon, September 11, 1962;

From these conferences, and numerous other subsidiary gatherings of experts and subordinate ministries, has emerged a large number of associations and groupings concerned with cooperation and coordination in a dozen or more aspects of common problems. In striking contrast with the rival, but fumbling, U.A.S.-Casablanca groupings, the Brazzaville-Monrovia groupings have devoted little effort to propaganda, controversy, cold wars, or the attractions of anti-colonial, anti-imperial, anti-Portuguese, or anti-Union of South Africa, agitations, or with interference with the domestic problems of neighboring

states. The Bloc's concerns have been economic and social rather than political or ideological, and, in approaching these problems, it has generally been conciliatory, tolerant, empirical, relatively democratic, pro-Western, and, above all, tentative. Most of its achievements have resulted from months of careful testing of the ground and have usually resulted from consideration by several "summit" conferences. Its charter of union, for example, was not signed until the fourth meeting, at Tananarive.

As a result of these agreements the Brazzaville Group now has the following principal manifestations:

- I. The U.A.M.S. itself consisting of
 - A. The semi-annual "Summit" Conferences;
 - B. A Secretariat and Secretary General at Cotonou, Dahomey.
- II. A Defense Union, consisting of
 - A. The Superior Council of Defense (consisting of 12 Defense Ministers); and
 - B. A General Staff and military secretariat-general at Ouagadougou, Volta.

This defense union is not linked to France, and it is indicative of the skill with which this Group has been operating that the defense center was placed in Volta, the only one of the four Equatorial states that did not sign the French-Equatoria military agreement of July 19, 1961. The defense union can, in theory, mobilize about 25,000 local troops, but has no common army or unified command.

III. The African Malgache Organization of Economic Cooperation (O.A.M.C.E.) with its central seat at Yaounde, where the secretary-general's office is occupied by the Malgache M. Ramafinbahing, who is also president of the Overseas Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the European Economic Community (Common Market).

IV. The African-Malgache Union of Posts and Telecommunications (U.A.M.P.T.) consisting of the 12 Ministers of Posts and

Telecommunications, with its center at Brazzaville.

This whole U.A.M.S. organization is financed by each state giving a percentage of its budget to a common fund. In 1961-1962 this totalled about 500 million African francs (CFA), of which over half were available for investment, divided among the various agencies as follows: 91 million francs CFA to the Secretariat-general, 183 million to O.A.M.C.E., 100 million to the Defense Pact, and 95 million to U.A.M.P.T.

Around and within, above and below, the central framework of U.A.M.S., a number of other groupings have been clustering. The Yaounde Conference, for example, set up, at least on paper, a joint air line, called "Air-Afrique," associated with "Air France." The Tananarive Conference signed the first three of a number of coordinating agreements (these three dealt with judicial cooperation, diplomatic representation, and civil status of persons); it also established four permanent committees of the "summit," dealing with economic and social questions, commercial relationships, financial and monetary matters, and science and technology. The two conferences of 1962 have worked to establish an inter-African development bank, a joint shipping line, and an African institute of scientific research.

THE MONROVIA GROUPINGS

Above the Brazzaville groupings, on the next higher level of what the Brazzaville leaders hope will become a world-wide system working for peace and cooperation, are the Monrovia groupings. These deliberately seek to duplicate the Brazzaville system but over a wider area and at a slower pace. It is possible, if this effort is successful, that the Brazzaville groupings may be allowed to fall into disuse, while all cooperative efforts would then be carried out through the Monrovia or even higher groupings on a Pan-African, Third Bloc, or United Nations level.

The Monrovia Conference of May 8-12, 1961, scored little concrete achievement but it did take a significant moral step forward. It added to the Brazzaville Twelve, three

English-speaking states (Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and three states under Islamic influence (Somalia, Tunisia and Libya), plus Ethiopia and Togo. At the subsequent Dakar Conference of Experts (July 17-24, 1961), no delegation came from Ethiopia. At the Second "Summit" Conference of the Monrovia Group, held at Lagos on January 24-30, 1962, a dispute over inviting the Algerian Provisional Government (F.L.N.) kept Tunisia, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and the three U.A.S. countries away and caused the Sudan to walk out. But the Monrovia Group now seems firmly established, to the great chagrin of Ghana.

One consequence of the apparent success of the Monrovia groupings may be to drive the U.A.S. trio closer to the Soviet Bloc, in spite of Guinea's disillusioning experiences with the U.S.S.R. It is, perhaps, significant that the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in October, 1961, had, for the first time, delegations from "non-Communist" parties, specifically from the ruling political parties of the three U.A.S. members. Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that the Sixth Congress of Mali's sole political party, the Sudanese Union, held at Bamako on September 10, 1962, had a return delegation from the Soviet Communist party.

The Dakar Conference of Experts in July, 1961, set up four permanent commissions to deal with economic, social, cultural and communications matters and drew up 16 recommendations to be considered at the Lagos summit meeting. At Lagos, on January 25-30, 1962, with Azikiwe of Nigeria presiding, the 20 delegations adopted a charter of organization which provided three organs: (1) the Assembly of Heads of States, to meet at least every two years, with equal voting and a two-thirds vote needed for any decision; (2) a Council of Members; and (3) a secretariat-general.

The resolutions and recommendations of the Monrovia Group show their desire for an African Common Market (including a customs union, an investment fund, a payments union, and regional exchange ac-

counts), an African Health Organization, greatly improved transport and communications (including an axis road system, an African merchant marine and airline, and telecommunications integration), and cultural cooperation and integration. Similar but more concrete aspirations were voiced at the two Brazzaville summit conferences of 1962 and will be considered by the Monrovia group summit meeting expected in the spring of 1963.

PRACTICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

The more tangible achievements which have resulted from all these activities around the multi-level Brazzaville-Monrovia axis have been of a functional character. The two existing customs unions of Equatorial and West Africa are now being integrated, and the Bangui Conference called for three additional customs unions (of northern and north-eastern Africa from Morocco to Somalia, eastern and central Africa, southern Africa with Madagascar) as a step on the way to an African Common Market. The West African Monetary Union of 1956 with its Central Bank of the West African States (B.C.E.A.O.), disrupted by the Guinea-Mali withdrawal, was almost fully integrated by the monetary accords of May 12, 1962, which centralized reserves, established free circulation and transfer within the seven states, and free convertibility between their *franc de la communauté financière africaine* (fr. CFA) and the new French franc (NF). The Monetary Union (U.M.O.A.) with a board of seven directors (one from each state) signed the agreement with France, while the B.C.E.A.O., transformed into the group's only note-issuing bank, has 21 directors (of which there are seven from France and two from each state). Mali formally withdrew from this system in July, 1962, when an extraordinary session of the Mali Assembly created a completely separate monetary system for that state, with a fully socialized banking system using a new Mali franc equal in value to the CFA franc.

Similar movements of functional integration in gradually widening areas have been

seen in other activities including health, education, communications and economics. A long-named Organization for Cooperation and Coordination in the Struggle Against the Great Endemic Diseases was created at Abijan on April 25, 1960, with seven West African members and a central headquarters at Bobo-Dioulasso, Volta. The 1961 budget of this organization was 300 million CFA of which half came from France.

In September, 1961, 14 of the Monrovia states met at Abijan to set up a Tropical African Radio Union parallel to the European Radio Union which extends as far south as 30° N. Latitude. This has been negotiating with an African National Radio and Television Union created by Morocco and Tunisia in 1960.

All these efforts of cooperation and coordination have been less notable in the field of economic development where planning decisions must be made on a more localized basis. On the initiative of Nigeria, delegations from six countries, with an observer from Ghana, met at Niamey, Niger, on July 5-7, 1962. With the three richest or most advanced states (Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal) not present, little of significance could be achieved, although the meeting called for a wider conference before the end of 1962.

The nature of this disappointment may be seen by a glance at the map. Senegal, traditionally the most advanced of French tropical areas, was cut off, by the Guinea-Mali break, from the rest of French Tropical Africa and is left, semi-isolated, with Mauritania, which is not only poor and undeveloped, but is Islamic, and clings to France and French Africa largely because of Morocco's territorial ambitions and the need for foreign capital to develop its isolated mineral resources. The rest of French Africa tends to group around the four Equatorial states and the four Entente states. Each of these groups consists of one state with rich resources (Gabon and Ivory Coast) with three (or four, counting Cameroons and Togo) states of lesser or even scanty resources. Naturally the two rich states are not eager to be joined in any

economic development union where their wealth or resources will be taken out of their control to be used for the advantage of their less fortunate neighbors. Each of these states has made such contributions, through the Equatorial and Entente Unions, but in a situation in which they still control their own wealth and economic decisions. It will be very difficult to change this situation rapidly.

PAN AFRICAN GROUPINGS

Before we look at the economic development actions of the Brazzaville Twelve, we should take a final glance at the Brazzaville-Monrovia axis as a whole. It seems to be growing on numerous levels of which the Twelve and the Twenty occupy adjacent levels in the middle ranges. Below them are two levels, of individual states and of local unions such as the Conseil de l'Entente, the Equatoria Bloc, or even U.D.A. Above it are various Pan-African groupings very tentative and largely functional in nature, but including the Technical Cooperation Commission for Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.) and the Scientific Council for the same area (C.S.A.).

For example, in the last week of August, 1961, delegations from 24 states of C.C.T.A. met at Abijan and adopted 27 resolutions concerned with such topics as census, housing, urban development, social security, health, and the role of women. On this same Pan-African level are other functional organizations such as the two African commissions of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions, which have a central office in Accra and have held annual conferences for the last four years at Jos (Nigeria), Kampala (Uganda), Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Dakar (July 2-6, 1962); or, as another example, the new African Trade Union Confederation which met at Dakar on January 9-14, 1962, set up a headquarters there, and hopes to pull together the rival African segments of the Christian, Socialist and Communist trade unions.

On the next higher level are various organ-

izations which have pan-European or third bloc overtones such as the European Common Market, its developing political counterpart, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.). On this same level are a number of French overseas organizations, such as the *Office de Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre Mer* (O.R.S.T.O.M.).

On the highest level are the world-wide organizations with which we are all familiar, including the United Nations, its specialized agencies such as UNESCO, WHO, or F.A.O., and other specialized organizations. The Brazzaville Twelve are extending to this level, commencing with an agreement in 1961 to establish a common permanent secretaryship at the United Nations, to agree together before important votes in the Assembly, and to begin by a campaign to work together for the admission of Mauritania as a member (successful, in spite of U.S.S.R. opposition, on October 27, 1961).

The Brazzaville Twelve are fully aware of their position in this multi-level structure. At all their "summit" conferences, they have referred to their position in this total framework. At Bangui in 1962 they said, "The U.A.M.S. is only a part of the larger group of African states known as the Monrovia Group. Both of these, while founded on the concept of African solidarity, have no other aim than to contribute to the creation of an international community by the elimination of war and the organization of world cooperation."

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

The key problem in this process will be the basic problem of any political organization, namely the structure of sovereignty and the nature of political allegiance. At present, each meeting on the Brazzaville, Monrovia, French Community, or United Nations levels finds the chiefs of states reiterating the total independence and sovereignty of their states (on the lowest level) and the claims of each state to the broadest (but not total) allegiance of its citizens. There is little indication to date of any eagerness by the Brazzaville states

to yield any of their power, independence, or sovereignty to a wider organization, so that all significant decisions on higher levels have to be referred back to the basic state level.

In the future there may be some tendency to break up sovereignty and public functions in order to attribute some of them to higher levels. This will open the whole problem of federalism which is alien to recent French tradition and has shown no signs of being accepted in French-speaking African states. In fact, these latter have sometimes criticized the constitution of Ghana which does contain a provision permitting such surrender of power.

It is this concentration of real power in the lowest, state level, which makes this level the sphere of operations of economic development. In such development, however, the two greatest needs, capital for investment and know-how to guide such investment, are in very short supply. Both come to a considerable extent from other levels and from other agencies.

No total figures can be given for economic assistance and investment from outside to U.A.M.S., but it is possible to give some indication of their source and quantity. The great bulk still comes from France and amounts to over one-half-billion new francs each year. For the 15 years from 1946 to January 1, 1961, French investment in U.A.M.S. was 8,547,300,000 NF, of which 756 million NF was given in 1960. Of this last figure 535.4 million NF was from Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (F.A.C.) which replaced FIDES in 1959. There has been a slight decrease in these grants in 1961 and 1962.

In three and one-half years (January, 1958 to July 1, 1961) the development fund of the Common Market granted 105,559,000 of its "units of account" for 90 projects in the Twelve. United Nations assistance to the group and that from U.N. associate agencies has generally been moderate. Direct U.N. assistance was only £143,000 in 1959 but rose to £5,476,000 in 1961-1962 (to six states, of which one was Mali). United

States aid, through I.C.A. and A.I.D., has been small. The same is generally true of other world sources of funds, including private and semi-public sources. The World Bank has provided a \$66 million loan for the Mauritanian iron exploitation, as well as one of \$35 million for the development of the vast and very rich manganese deposits of Gabon.

Within Africa itself investment funds come from public rather than private sources. Ivory Coast and Gabon each provide some funds for the associates of their respective unions (the Entente and Equatoria) and the Brazzaville Union provides about 200 million CFA for its members states. Little can be accumulated from commercial exports, as the twelve states together had a favorable balance of international payments in 1960 of only \$25.9 million which was due entirely to the Ivory Coast's favorable balance of \$30.9 million. Eight of the twelve had unfavorable balances in 1960; these, as usual, were made up from French assistance.

Increasingly, investment and economic development in French Tropical Africa depends on public funds or funds working through semi-public agencies. Low private incomes combined with weak traditions of saving provide relatively little incentive or opportunity for private investment, and these have been weakened further by ambiguity over where the lines between public and private will be drawn in a mixed economy. This was pointed out in Paris on June 4, 1962, at a convention of representatives of overseas construction firms. These also pointed out the fiscal threats to private investment, including the discouraging nature of such burdens and the steady threat of inflation or increasing taxes from generally unbalanced state budgets.

In the last three years, each Brazzaville state has inaugurated a development plan of from three to five years, and most have created a Development Bank, either from scratch or by reorganizing a local bank. In most cases, a little more than half of the capital for such a bank comes from the state, with most of the rest from French or local

public agencies. A few glances at these separate states will clarify the situation.

Senegal, most advanced of the Twelve, created a Senegalese Bank of Development with 525 million francs CFA of capital on January 13, 1960. In its first year of operations it made loans of 9,992,844,000 francs CFA. During this period a Development Commission drew up a detailed study of the Senegal economy in 1959-1960 and a Four Year Plan for 1961-1964. It observed industrial activities of about 60 billion francs CFA in 1959, of which 57.5 billion was in the private sector, but of this 35.4 billion was in processing of food and tobacco. Retrospectively it observed a growth rate in industry of about five per cent a year and set a target of industrial expansion of eight per cent a year over each of the four years of the Plan. The first year achievement, however, was only six per cent.

This first year did achieve an increase in 1961 over 1959 of 18.2 per cent in building construction, 43.2 per cent in energy (mostly electric) production, 10.6 per cent in textiles, 9.6 per cent in fertilizers, and 296.6 per cent in mineral production (chiefly because phosphates increased from 107,686 tons in 1960 to 408,000 tons in 1961). Agricultural production was up considerably in most items. In general, public investment in 1961 was 10.1 billion francs CFA compared to a target of 9.8 billion, but real investment as a whole was only 60 per cent of the plan target, largely because of the lag in private investment.

Some of the reasons for this lag in private investments may be seen in the Senegal budget for 1962-1963 (adopted on June 13, 1962) which shows, in a total budget of 40.2 billion francs CFA, an increase of 26.6 per cent in direct taxes, 17.6 per cent in indirect taxes, and a rise in the public debt from 464.8 million in 1961 to 935.6 million in 1962-1963. The Senegalese unfavorable balance of payments, which has existed since 1945, was \$16.5 million in 1960 (this includes Mauritania) and will undoubtedly continue.

This rather mixed picture is brightened considerably in terms of social amelioration

and advancing standards of living. For example, education, which is one of the chief items in the Four Year Plan, exceeded its target in the first year on both primary and secondary levels.

An analysis similar to this could be made for each of the twelve states and would show a somewhat similar picture, with considerably brighter conditions in Ivory Coast or Gabon and considerably darker conditions in Upper Volta or Chad. The over-all conclusion would be that conditions are hopeful but not spectacular. One reason for continued optimism may be seen in the glowing report on the French economy issued by O.E.C.D. on September 14, 1962, because the economic position of the Brazzaville states is still underwritten by and imitative of France.

SHIFTS IN EMPHASIS

Any examination of economic development in French Africa in recent years will show definite shifts in emphasis of outlook. (1) There has been a definite turning away from large spectacular enterprises which attracted so much favor a few years ago and which still do in some English-speaking parts of Africa. The conviction is growing that such projects absorb enormous amounts of capital and tie up much of the scarce local supply of skilled labor and, when finished, contribute surprisingly little to local standards of living and almost nothing to local wage pools. Re-examination of projects costing scores and even hundreds of millions of dollars have shown that they would provide employment for, at most, a few hundred persons.

(2) For somewhat similar reasons, there has been generally a shift of emphasis from industrialization of any heavy or mass-production type toward more emphasis on agriculture and light processing of local materials and produce. Planning schedules have increasingly focused attention on the concept of "value added" to products by processing and the need to provide local markets for local raw materials. The Ivory Coast, for example, tripled its industrial production in seven years from 4 billion francs CFA in 1954 to 10 billion in 1960 and to 12 billion

in 1961. In the latter year, using 2 billion francs worth of primary materials (of which 1.5 billion were local agricultural products) it added 10 billion francs worth to final production value, and was able to satisfy almost one-third of local needs in industrial products. As a more concrete example, Cameroun in 1960 increased its bicycle production by 30 per cent over 1959 (to 10,700 units) and was able to export bicycles to Chad and Gabon.

(3) Closely related to this has been a shift in emphasis in agriculture (speaking relatively) from increasing the output of cash crops toward increasing output of local crops for domestic consumption. Moreover, in transportation, on which there has been increasing expenditure, this emphasis (except for port development) has been shifting to local communications for local markets rather than toward mass transport linked to world markets. The chief causes of this have been fluctuating demand and falling prices on the world markets. For example, the Ivory Coast in 1961 set a new record for coffee production, ranking third among the world's producers, and improved its quality from 45 per cent "superior" grade in 1960 to 60 per cent "superior" in 1961, yet planters' incomes were down about 50 per cent because of the fall in world coffee prices. France once again stepped into the breach by signing an agreement to buy a major part of the crop over the next five years at several times the world price level. A similar situation occurred in cocoa. Ivory Coast set a production record in 1961 and improved its quality from 69 per cent superior in 1959 to 84 per cent superior in 1961. Yet planters in the latter year received over 2 billion francs CFA less for their crop than in the preceding year.

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"Of all the areas of Africa today," writes this specialist, "East Africa has the most promise at present of evolving a federation of some kind, economic if not political."

Changing East Africa

By LEONARD S. KENWORTHY

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JUST HOW apt the term "East Africa" really is, is a debatable issue. There are some factors which make the use of that term permissible, but there are others which make its suitability doubtful. If it is used, it ought to be employed loosely and sparingly, for what we call East Africa is actually a vast and varied territory.

In area it comprises approximately 680,000 square miles, north and south of the Equator, a region equal to a quarter of the continental United States or the space occupied by the British Isles, France, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. That expanse is divided among Kenya (with 225,000 square miles), Tanganyika (with 362,000 square miles), Uganda (with 95,000 square miles), and the Zanzibar Protectorate including Pemba (with a total of 1020 square miles). Thus Tanganyika covers slightly more than one-half of the area, Kenya more than one-third, and Uganda slightly less than one-sixth.

Within that territory are tremendous variations in topography and climate. Along the Indian Ocean is a coastal plain, which extends inland for 10 to 40 miles, where the climate is hot and humid. Then the land rises until it reaches the East African Plateau, which occupies a large part of East Africa, and is anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 feet in height. Next comes the Lake Victoria area, with the lake itself as large as Scotland or The Netherlands, making it the second largest

fresh-water body in the world (next to Lake Superior). Finally, in the extreme west are the mountains bordering on the new states of Rwanda and Burundi, and the Congo. In most of this vast expanse the weather is very comfortable, with warm days and cool or cold nights, contrary to the stereotypes about Africa's climate.

Since East Africa as a whole must depend almost solely upon agriculture, the amount of rainfall and its reliability is highly important. Approximately 60 per cent of Kenya has less than 20 inches of rain per year and there are long periods of drought and then torrential floods such as that nation has suffered this past year. Tanganyika has been likened to a saucer with good rainfall around the rim and less than 20 inches in the central area. In this respect Uganda is better off, which is one reason for the wealth of that territory, compared to the other two major regions.

A glance at any statistical tables of the people of East Africa might lead one to think that there are more similarities than differences in this regard. Approximately 97.5 per cent of the people are Africans and most of them are Bantu in background. But there the similarities end and the differences begin.

There are scores of tribes in East Africa; Tanganyika alone is supposed to have at least 120. Some of them are very small, a few are very large, like the Kikuyu in Kenya, with

a million and a half persons; the Luo in Kenya, with around a million; and the Sukuma in Tanganyika, with over a million. It is hazardous to select the most modern or westernized tribes, but most authorities would at least mention the Kikuyu and Luo in Kenya, the Chaggas in Tanganyika, and the Buganda in Uganda.

In contrast, there are several pre-literate tribes, leading a nomadic life. There are even tribes which resemble the Bushmen of Southwest Africa, such as the Sandawe in Central Tanganyika, and the Pygmies of the Kalahari, such as the Batwa in Uganda. Such vast differences complicate the economic picture, because the pre-literate groups contribute little or nothing to the expanding cash economies, and confuse the political picture, because the less-developed groups fear the domination of the more modern tribes, especially in lands like Kenya and Uganda.

Even the boundaries of these states have been drawn without respect to tribes. This is most noticeable now in the negotiations over the future of Kenya, with the Somalis and some other groups in the north demanding the right to join Somalia and the Arabs of the Coastal Strip along the Indian Ocean and calling for a separate state or for their "return" to Zanzibar.

Religiously there are vast differences, too. Most of the Africans are animist but large numbers of them are Christians. This might be assumed to lead to some degree of unity, but that is not always so. In thinking about Uganda, it is well to remember that there were religious wars between Protestants and Catholics in the late nineteenth century and the embers of that conflagration are still warm in Africa. And in Kenya, at least, there is considerable rivalry between Catholics and Protestants, especially over schools. Then there are the Muslims and the Hindus to complicate the picture.

One further factor should also be mentioned while we are enumerating the divisive forces in East Africa: the tension between generations. Some such conflict exists in most parts of the world today but in develop-

ing areas like East Africa it is a problem of major proportions.

However, the real complication in East Africa as far as people are concerned is the plural or multi-racial nature of these nations. In West Africa there are many Lebanese and Syrians, earning their living primarily as middlemen, in addition to some Europeans. But those countries are almost exclusively African.

No so in East Africa. In Kenya there are approximately 170,000 Asians; 65,000 Europeans; 36,000 Arabs; and 6,000 others in a total population of 6,600,000. In Tanganyika there are approximately 80,000 Asians; 21,000 Europeans; 20,000 Arabs; and 7,000 others in a total population of nearly 9,000,000. In Uganda there are 75,000 Asians; 10,000 Europeans; 2,000 Arabs; and 5,000 others in a total population of around 6,500,000. And in Zanzibar and Pemba there are 75,000 Asians; 45,000 Arabs; 500 Europeans; and 4,000 others in a total population of 300,000.

Economically and politically the situation is most acute in Kenya, where the large-scale shop-keepers are mostly Asian and the farmers are mostly European. Both groups have contributed immeasurably to the modernization of that region and to its economic advances. But the resentment against the ownership of the "White Highlands" by Europeans and their political domination for more than half a century is almost matched by the hostility towards the Asians for the wealth some of them have amassed and the tactics some of them have used to acquire it.

Conditions are not nearly so tense in Tanganyika, where there have been far fewer Europeans and where they have not owned the major part of the best land (in Uganda they do not own land). But antagonism towards Asians is acute, especially in Uganda, where there have been outbreaks against them in recent months.

EAST AFRICAN POVERTY

Turning more directly to the economics of East Africa, one fact stands out above all others: the widespread poverty of this entire

area. Its land is poor, its mineral resources limited, its industrialization meager, its health conditions deplorable, and its educational standards low. Measured by the standards of West Africa, for example, this region is far down the economic scale. Per capita income figures are not too reliable, but they give some indication of general standards of living. Of the four East African territories, Tanganyika is the lowest, with between \$40 and \$50 per person per year. Kenya comes next, with \$60 to \$70 per person per year, including the Asians and Europeans, whose incomes are fabulous compared to those of the Africans. Uganda is slightly better off, with something over \$100 per person per year. The Zanzibar Protectorate is around \$100. None of these compares favorably with the per capita income of Ghana, which is slightly better than \$150 per person per year. The only Africans with a relatively respectable standard of living are some of the inhabitants of Uganda, where one sees a surprising number of automobiles, for example. Elsewhere burdens are still carried by women, by burros, and in some places by camels.

In Kenya, the tea pickers whom this writer visited in 1961 were receiving \$10 to \$12 a month and the beginning school teachers \$375 to \$400 per year. The average middle-class African hopes to purchase a bicycle if all goes well, and there are thousands of bicycles in and around the larger towns and cities. Automobiles are owned almost exclusively by Europeans. People live in mud or dried brick houses, eat inadequate meals, and fall prey to the many diseases, old and new, which are prevalent in East Africa. One writer reports that the item most desired by Africans in this part of the continent is "piped-water," which may give readers another clue to the level of aspirations of these people.

Crucial as economic questions are, they have been shunted largely into the background. At the moment politics is preeminent. That is inevitable, at least until all the areas attain their independence. Then the politicians will have to turn their attention to the harsh realities of economics if there is

to be any positive answer to the revolution of rising expectations which has reached this part of the world.

Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika is one of the African leaders who has long realized the importance of economic factors. Before he became Prime Minister, he kept asserting that "We are going to be spending a great deal of time exhorting people to work hard and I am certain that our people are going to respond to this call to work hard and raise the standard of living of themselves and our children."

Exhortation is essential; but it is not enough. What else is being done? Many countries rely heavily on their mineral resources to increase the gross national product. This is possible in East Africa only to a limited extent because these nations have very restricted mineral resources.

MINERAL RESOURCES

Tanganyika is the most fortunate in this respect for it has some diamonds, a little gold, and salt, silver, and mica in that order. Yet the total value of the diamonds mined in 1960 was only \$13,000,000 and of gold, \$3,600,000. Kenya's mineral resources are drastically limited. It has some copper and a little diatomite and graphite. But soda is its one big product. Lake Magadi furnishes the largest source of soda in the world, with the soda crystallizing faster than it is mined. Yet the yield last year was valued at only \$3,000,000. Uganda has some tin, beryl, galena and apatite, but copper is its chief mineral. The Kilembe Mines were opened in 1956 and already the export of copper has jumped to third place, after coffee and cotton, but the total value is only slightly over \$3,000,000 a year.

Whereas Northern Rhodesia's minerals accounted for 95 per cent of her total exports in a recent year, the Congo's minerals 60 per cent and Ghana's 24 per cent, Kenya's mineral exports totalled only 6 per cent of her exports, Tanganyika 3 per cent, and Uganda about 4 per cent.

The search for more minerals continues, but it does not look as if East Africa can count

on mineral wealth for much improvement economically.

This is an agricultural part of the globe and any advances economically are likely to be dependent upon improvements in agriculture and upon secondary industries based on farm products.

In Kenya 75 to 80 per cent of the cash income of the country until recently has been produced by the European farmers on their large plots of ground, using fairly modern methods and machinery. This has come from coffee, tea, and sisal for the most part, with increasing income in recent years from pyrethrum. Cotton, tobacco and rice are also grown in smaller amounts.

The Africans have lived largely on tiny plots of ground, ranging from one to three or four acres, on which they have grown just enough to subsist. Poor farming methods, poor seeds, the lack of rotation of crops, and the lack of fertilizers have kept their production to a minimum.

But all that is changing fairly rapidly in Kenya today. The land consolidation and villagization program which was forced on the Kikuyu at the time of the Mau Mau rebellion has now gained ground elsewhere by free choice, thus making larger plots of ground possible. Newer methods of farming are gradually being introduced and there are a few farmers who are beginning to make a few hundred dollars a year on small farms of 10-15 acres. New crops are being introduced, and the old restrictions against Africans raising the highly lucrative crop of pyrethrum have been relaxed.

But the pressures on the land in Kenya are still terrific. Much of the good land is owned by Europeans; in a section like the Nyanza Province in the west, there are as many as 3,000 persons to the square mile in some places. Just what the final adjustment will be on the ownership of the White Highlands in independent Kenya is still not clear, but there is no doubt that the Africans will gain some fertile farmland in that section.

In Tanganyika 80 per cent of the export earnings are from agriculture and 45 per cent of the total output of the country is from

agricultural products. Sisal is the largest export crop. This new nation produces two-thirds of the world's sisal, with the plantations owned largely by Europeans. On the other hand most of the coffee is owned by Africans and marketed by cooperatives. Much of it is grown on the slopes of Kilimanjaro by the Chagga tribe, which is a comparatively well-to-do group. In Moshi they built a \$600,000 College of Commerce (actually a technical high school) a few years ago with profits from their coffee cooperatives and recently built a \$250,000 elementary school in the same way. Cotton is also grown, as well as tea, tobacco and pyrethrum.

Agriculture ranks highest in the priorities of the Three Year Development Plan, with plans for small holder cooperative farms of 80 to 100 acres, the extension of the farming areas by irrigation, and the improvement of the quality of farm products.

One of the great strengths of Tanganyika is its strong cooperative movement, which is considered among the most powerful in the world.

In Uganda, cotton and coffee are the main crops for export, with tea a poor third. In fact, Uganda is the largest coffee producer in the Commonwealth and the fourth largest cotton producer. These two crops have run nip and tuck for several years, with coffee now outranking cotton.

Some of the soil of Uganda is among the best in all of East Africa and the soaring world prices of cotton and coffee after World War II brought Uganda a period of spectacular development. But the shaky prices of more recent times and the growing realization that two export crops were a rather shaky basis for a country's economy have caused planners to turn more and more to industrialization in recent years.

Zanzibar has existed largely on her clove market and on clove-stem oil, aided a little by fishing. But that is not a firm basis for an economy; Zanzibar will have to broaden this base eventually if it is to have a higher standard of living and more economic stability.

Marketing boards to stabilize prices and to

maintain the quality of products on the world market as well as to insure revenue for the governments are now powerful bodies in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda and are almost certain to be retained as essential to the growth and development of these countries once they have all obtained independence.

But even vast improvements in agriculture will not provide the firm economies these nations need. So, in recent times, there has been a trend toward more and more industrialization in East Africa. This has been particularly noticeable in Kenya and in Uganda.

Industrialization has been made possible in larger part because of the erection of the mammoth Owen Falls hydroelectric plant near the source of the Nile in Uganda, which supplies power to the new industries of that nation and much of the power for Kenya. Under the aegis of the Uganda Development Corporation, the Kilembe copper mining and smelting industries have been started, an asbestos industry begun, and a domestic hollow-ware factory established. More recently the production of phosphates from the Sukulu mineral deposits of northeastern Uganda has been fostered. Some privately owned cotton ginneries, coffee hulleries, and oil mills exist in various parts of Uganda but most of the light industry is in the Kampala-Jinja-Tororo districts, including textiles, cement, metal products, plywood, and brewing, in addition to those already cited.

Kenya is turning more and more to secondary industries such as the processing of farm products, the canning of fruits and vegetables, and the freezing of fish. Several tea processing plants are already in operation and others are planned. There are also automobile and tire factories, beer plants, cigarette factories, and establishments for the production of chemicals, bricks, pottery and glass. Within recent years two large cement factories have been built, making Kenya self-sufficient in that respect. In Mombasa there are also oil refineries to supply the factories of Kenya and the ships which come to the port there.

In all of this development of industry

Kenya is highly dependent upon neighboring nations, for she obtains most of her power from the Owen Falls plant and from a smaller plant at the Pandani Falls in Tanganyika.

Tanganyika has not made so much progress as yet in industrialization, but a ride from the airport to the center of Dar-es-Salaam would be most revealing to most readers for some of the most modern factories in the world are located there and in the environs of that capital city, with striking modern architecture as well as modern machinery. These include a wide variety of products, among them shoes, metal containers, leather goods, textiles, meat and fish canning, bag making, cashew nut processing, and cement production.

Thus East Africa moves ahead with the development of secondary industries in an effort to build a stable economy and provide a higher standard of living for her population.

UNIFYING FACTORS

Despite the many differences already discussed in this article, there are several factors fostering unity among these separate parts of East Africa.

One of the most important of these is the common language of Swahili, spoken by most Africans in this entire area. Because of the rule of the British, English is another common language for the educated populace of East Africa.

A second factor has just been mentioned—the dependence of Kenya on Uganda and to a lesser degree on Tanganyika for power. Similarly there is the interdependence of this area on common ports, with Kenya and northern Tanganyika using Mombasa for

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"The present direction of Ghana's international trade makes it belong to the Western trade hemisphere," notes this economist, who points out that "It is understandable that a serious effort is being made to shift the direction of trade more Eastwards, because Ghana wishes to be less dependent on the West."

Ghana's Struggle for Economic Independence

By ADHEMAR BYL

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WHEN in March, 1957, Ghana's independence day celebrations were publicized in the world press, many undoubtedly had trouble locating the country. Now, Ghana and its founder, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, are familiar to almost everyone. Recent attempts on the life of the Osagyefo have added to the interest in the development of this new nation.¹

Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all the rest will be added upon.

—Dr. Kwame Nkrumah

The current history of Ghana started in 1949 when Kwame Nkrumah returned to his country after studying law and philosophy in the United States, and economics in the United Kingdom. He soon organized his Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) of which

he is now the life-chairman. After organizing a non-violent Positive Action (strikes and boycotts) campaign against the British authorities, he was arrested. While he was in prison, his party, under the direction of Kojo Botsio and Komla Gbedemah, managed to get him elected with an overwhelming majority. And so he rose overnight from P.G. (prison graduate) to P.M. (prime minister). Governor Sir Charles Arden Clarke, who first arrested him and later appointed him as "leader of government business," declared:

Nkrumah is both sincere and able. He is anxious to make the Gold Coast experiment work, as an example and inspiration to other Africans, and to convince the whites that Africans can rule themselves in their own country.²

Nkrumah also showed that he could forget about the past:

I came out of gaol and into the Assembly without the slightest feeling of bitterness to Britain. I stand for no discrimination against any race or individual, but I am unalterably opposed to imperialism in any form.³

Actually the resident white population has increased from about 7,000 at independence to about 13,000 now.

At midnight on June 30, 1960, Ghana changed its Dominion status and became a

¹ I am thankful to Professor Kannappan of the Economics Department at M.S.U. for his advice in drafting this article, and to the African Language and Area Center for material assistance in research. The responsibility for the views expressed is entirely mine.

² Alexander Campbell, *"The Heart of Africa"*, Longmans Green and Co., London, N.Y., Toronto, 1954, p. 394.

³ *"The TIMES"*, London, February 14, 1951, or Kwame Nkrumah, *"Ghana: an Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah"*, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., London, N.Y., Toronto, Johannesburg, 1957, p. 138.

Commonwealth republic. The president holds the executive power and forms the government. He is controlled by a parliament elected every five years by universal suffrage. The parliament is made up of one house with 114 members (10 women members have been added since June 29, 1960). The leader of the biggest party is automatically president and is also the commander-in-chief of the army.

The country inherited the British constituency election system with one representative for each constituency. This certainly contributed to the weakness of the opposition parties. When in the general election of July, 1956, the C.P.P. won 72 of the 104 seats, it really captured only 57 per cent of the votes. Because several opposition members crossed the floor, or lost by-elections, the C.P.P. holds now 102 out of 114 seats in the remodelled National Assembly.

Although it is said that at the start of his career, Nkrumah himself insisted that sociology Professor Busia should organize the scattered opposition parties in a strong United Party, Ghana has now a "one-party system." The title of "Leader of the Opposition" was abolished and the non-C.P.P. members of Parliament became the Minority Group.

On several occasions Nkrumah and the Ghanaian ministers have pointed out that there was no African tradition even vaguely comparable with the concept of a Loyal Opposition. Kofi Baako, Minister of Defense, told the Ghana National Assembly recently:

... the historical reasons that have given birth to the multi-party system in other places do not apply here. Here ... we know of the council of elders. ... There is no question of a deliberate division of that group, one side saying "I am opposing" and another side saying "I am governing." All of them in fact govern and they govern by consultation and by deliberation.⁴

⁴ "Ghana Today," published by the Information Section of the Ghana Office, London, Vol. 6, No. 7, June 6, 1962, p. 2.

⁵ "Ghana, An Economic Survey," Barclays Bank D.C.O., London, February 1962, pages 6, 11, and 25.

TROPICAL AFRICA'S RICHEST COUNTRY

The richness of Ghana exists in its people, its soil, and its sound international trade position. The Ghanaian people, although of different tribal origins, have common features of intelligence, friendliness, progressiveness and ease in cooperation with foreigners. Ghana can also count on a group of women who are more educated and emancipated than those in any other African state. In fact, women have always played an important role in the economic and social life of Ghana. The traditional position of the Queen Mother and the economic and political role of market women are cases in point. Now that the first "People's shop" has been opened at Accra and Ghana is more and more moving towards strict import controls, one may expect a growing opposition from the "Market Women Organizations," especially since recently the Accra town council has interfered with their traditionally untaxed roadside trading stalls, practically chasing them all to the public markets, where taxes can be easily collected and where "business is less good."

ONE CROP SYSTEM

"Cocoa is for Ghana, what the Nile is for Egypt," wrote the secretary of the Ghanaian Minister of Finance. Ghana's agricultural system, like that of many a developing country, is mainly a one-crop system. About 30 per cent of the world export of cocoa originates in Ghana, and cocoa represented about 60 per cent of the total Ghanaian exports, and more than 90 per cent of the exports of agricultural products in 1960.⁵

In the Ghanaian economy, the export duty on cocoa serves not only to cover the current expenses of the country, but also to finance the investment plans and programs of the government.

The most important fact in cocoa cultivation in Ghana is that the 30 per cent of the world's cocoa crop that is grown there is almost entirely grown by small African farmers on farms seldom exceeding 6 acres in extent. This is primarily due to the land tenure system that did not permit Europeans to possess land. The 300,000 cocoa farmers, their

250,000 seasonal laborers, and their respective families—more than one-third of the population—are directly dependent on cocoa. Besides the dangers inherent in a one-crop economy and the fact that cocoa is a product somewhere between a luxury and a consumption article, easily replaceable by an “ersatz product,” there is also the danger of cocoa diseases. The “Swollen Shoot” disease threatened all cocoa cultivation in Ghana between 1946 and 1956. It has been put under control only at the cost of cutting down 101 million cocoa trees.⁶ This was possible only because Dr. Nkrumah helped the British convince the cocoa farmers of the necessity of this cutting-out campaign.

A few other agricultural commodities are exported and many kinds of tropical crops and even European vegetables are grown in Ghana for domestic consumption. Among the lesser export crops are palm kernels, palm oil, limes, kola, kopra, sheabutter, coffee, rubber and bananas. None of these products reaches a figure of more than a fragment of one per cent of the total export figure. Tropical food crops for home consumption are produced in such quantities that Ghana is largely self-sufficient. Imports mainly of wheat, rice, milk and sugar still represented more than 16 per cent of the total imports in 1960 against 16.9 per cent in 1959 and 16.5 per cent in 1958.

MINERAL WEALTH

After cocoa, minerals are the main source of wealth. Mining comprises the digging of gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite. The number of workers employed by mining companies is constantly decreasing due primarily to increased mechanization. About 47,000 workers out of a total wage earning labor force of about 320,000 are involved.

In world gold production of 1960—without counting the Soviet Union—Ghana, the old Gold Coast, ranked fifth, with 2.7 per cent of the total production. In the year ending

March, 1960, total production of gold in the seven working mines was 915,317 fine ounces, the highest production figure in the history of the country. Despite these encouraging figures, the industry faces the same problem faced elsewhere; costs are rising, whereas the official price is stabilized at \$35 by the only important buyer, the United States.

Notwithstanding government subsidy, two marginal mines had already been compelled to close, when in 1960 some other gold mining companies announced their intention of closing down.

The Government (first) responded dramatically with the Mines Abandonment Bill. Under its terms gold mining companies operating in Ghana received notice that, if they close mines or allow them to be flooded without the permission of the Government, they face a possible fine up to 100,000 pounds. In addition, directors, managers, and officers of corporate bodies holding mining concessions are liable to prison terms. . . .⁷

This caused a lot of alarm in the business world in general and was bound to have its effect on future investment decisions by foreign private enterprises in Ghana. This danger was soon realized by the Ghanaian government. It reversed its policy and offered 5,250,000 pounds for five of the marginal mines, this was approximately double the price ruling on the London Stock Exchange. This adequate compensation offer—called for in the Ghanaian constitution in case of nationalization—was accepted by the directors of the mines involved. The Ghana State Mining Corporation took over the operations of these mines, leaving only the Ashanti and Konongo mines in private hands.

The problem of the marginal gold mines remains unsolved. Future calculations can, however, now be made at leisure and in the national interest. The government may have to look for possibilities to redeploy in new and more remunerative projects the approximately 23,000 miners involved.

By 1920, commercial exploitation of diamonds by European firms started. Since 1933 licensed Africans have also been digging for diamonds with spades, and washing

⁶ “Overseas Survey,” Barclays Bank, D.C.O., January, 1961, p. 54.

⁷ “West African Review,” June, 1961, “Crisis in Ghana’s Gold Mines,” pp. 6–9.

the gravel with calabashes. Despite their primitive methods and the absence of exhaustive processing of the gravel, the African diggers constantly increased their production until they reached close to 60 per cent of the total production in the years between 1957 and 1960. The number of independent Africans involved is 12,000 against 3,500 in the European mines and in the one state mine. The latter is the Holland Syndicate, taken over by the government in the same way as some of the gold mines.

Recently, all diamonds have been marketed in the Government Diamond Market in Accra. In 1959, Ghana ranked second in world diamond production if calculations were made in carats (Ghana 3,076,000, Congo 14,854,000). Because industrial diamonds account for some 75 per cent of the total production, in value Ghana ranked far behind Sierra Leone and South Africa.⁸ The dependence of Ghana on machines and equipment from South Africa for the diamond mines is a weakness if there should be a long boycott of South African goods.

The opencast mine at Nsuta, near Tarkwa, is the largest manganese mine in the world and Ghana is normally the third largest producer, preceded only by Russia and India. Manganese mining in Ghana amounts to 60 to 70 per cent of the value of the gold export. Deposits of bauxite have been estimated by the Geological Survey Department at over 200 million tons. As bauxite is a basic material for the production of aluminum, the presence of the large bauxite deposits is the basis for the Volta Dam and the connected aluminum smelter that is to be built at Tema.

CRISIS IN TIMBER

Since 1959, timber has passed gold and diamonds on Ghana's export list, and ranks now

second, behind cocoa. The success of the Cocoa and the Diamond Marketing Boards, especially from the point of view of the Government, and grievances of small Ghanaian timber producers, gave rise to a problematic experiment in Ghanaian socialism, the *Timber Marketing Board*.

The main grievance was that the small men were too much at the mercy of the resident buyers in Takoradi who not only bought their timber but financed their operations with advance loans. The resident buyers thus had a lien on the producer's timber before it was delivered.⁹

TIMBER MARKETING BOARD

The Timber Marketing Board started buying Wawa in October, 1960, and took over the purchase of logs of all species on September 1, 1961. First a transport problem and later confusion in grading, brought production virtually to a standstill. Opponents of the Board argued that timber, unlike cocoa, was not suitable for marketing by this method, because buyers prefer individual woods from individual companies.

A new manager tried to solve the Board's problems. He neither improved the lot of the small producer, nor did he solve the grading problem completely. The transport problem solved itself due to a world recession in timber, the board has resigned itself to the fact that the small marginal producer is going out of business. This may in due time alarm the small cocoa farmers and the native diamond diggers and put more strain on the Nkrumah regime.

It was recently announced that

the Ghana Agricultural Produce Marketing Board will now become solely responsible for the purchase of logs and all timber species with effect from October 1, 1962. Grading and measurement of the logs purchased for export will be the responsibility of the grading staff of the Forestry Department.¹⁰

This was certainly an uneasy experiment and if next year's reports indicate further difficulties, the whole idea of government timber marketing may have to be abandoned before serious damage to the timber trade has been done.

⁸ "Overseas Survey—1962," Barclays Bank D.C.O., p. 53.

⁹ "Economic Planning in Ghana—3," *West Africa*, March 17, 1962, p. 296. See also this article for more detailed information on this problem.

¹⁰ "Overseas Review," Barclays Bank D.C.O., August, 1962, p. 60 and 61.

TABLE I

Ghana: Balance of Payments 1956-1960

Year	Payments	Receipts	Balance
1956	125.8	112.5	-13.3
1957	136.7	122.3	-14.4
1958	127.2	138.0	*10.8
1959	156.8	145.5	-11.2
1960	177.0	150.4	-26.6

Source: "Ghana—An Economic Survey," Barclays Bank D.C.O., February 1962, p. 27.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Mr. Imoru Egala, Minister of Industries, recently said in Accra that Ghana did not propose to continue to export for any length of time in the future such raw materials as cocoa, timber, minerals and ferrous scrap so that other countries might convert them into finished products and sell back to her at inordinate profits.¹¹

Nonetheless external trade has still the same major characteristics: import of finished products and export of raw materials. Except in 1956, 1957 and 1960 there has always been an export surplus, notwithstanding the constantly growing import figure. Due to the large development projects there has been, since 1956, a constant imbalance in the countries overseas payments (except in 1958) as is shown in Table I.

To finance the above deficits, the Ghanaian government has heavily drawn on its own foreign assets and on those of the Cocoa Marketing Board. The total overseas assets of Ghana diminished from £208,134,000 to £114,816,000 in the period between December, 1955 and June, 1961.

The Ghanaian government is fully aware of this situation; it stated in its economic survey for 1960:

As long as the budget deficit is financed mainly through reductions in external assets there will not be any serious danger to price stability. . . .

¹¹ "Ghana Today," *o.c.*, July 4, 1962, p. 5.

¹² For more detailed information on these events and on the government control over unions see Lester N. Trachtman, "The Labor Movement of Ghana: A Study in Political Unionism," *Econ. Dev. and Cultural Change*, Vol. X, N. 2, part I, pp. 183-200.

When external assets have been exhausted, the gap will have to be covered by increased savings (voluntary and otherwise) and foreign loans and aid.

When Dr. Nkrumah started forcing the Ghanaians to save 10 per cent of their salary, the Railway and Port Workers Union in Takoradi started an illegal strike, this despite tight government control over the Ghana T.U.C. since 1958.¹² To spread the burden equally on both labor and management, foreign firms are now forced to reinvest 60 per cent of their profits in Ghana.

The trade pattern of Ghana is completely Western: The share of all the Communist countries together did not even reach 5 per cent of the imports and 7 per cent of the exports. When Ghana wants the fullest possible support of Russia, China and the satellites, it is normal that it will have to shift a part of its trade from Western to Eastern countries: Ghana cocoa for Soviet factories. This is the reason why import licenses for goods from Communist countries have been granted much faster than for traditional lines from the West.

GHANA AND THE E.E.C.

From the above figures it may be noticed also that the E.E.C. is practically as good a customer of Ghana as the Sterling area. But as Ghana buys about 10 per cent less from the E.E.C. than it sells to it, it has a well-founded fear that the 4.5 per cent entry-tax on its cocoa may cause the European countries to look for cocoa in associated territories of the E.E.C. Dr. Nkrumah fully realizes that, if

Britain joins the E.E.C., one way to abolish this handicap is to associate Ghana with the E.E.C. His opposition towards Europe is mainly political because of his neutrality: he does not want to associate his country with a Nato-oriented political unit. His economic objection is that the E.E.C. constitutes an alliance of industrialized nations. According to Nkrumah, an African country that wants to industrialize will be a competitor of Europe, and Europe does not want African competitors—only African raw material suppliers.

Both Professor Arthur Lewis of Manchester University and Professor J. Bognar from Hungary—the present economic advisor of Ghana—have stressed the goal of industrialization. "The Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast" by Lewis, written in 1953, is a classic in the literature on economic development.

In line with the balanced growth theory, the report advised a preparatory stage in which agriculture was brought up to a level where it could produce enough food. It is only since 1957 that the government has started serious efforts towards industrialization. This meant stepping up the preparations for the Volta River Project, on whose power production all industries in Ghana are dependent.

Activities at the dam site at Akosombo started on January 23, 1962. Since then construction has progressed quite rapidly. The project will provide more than 750,000 kw electric power, of which 500,000 kw will be used for the smelter of VALCO (Volta Aluminum Company).

DEVELOPMENT PLANS

In order to encourage new industries, an Industrial Development and Investment Division was set up under a Development Secretariat in the Office of the President.

Two State Commissions were set up to ensure proper planning, co-ordination and control in all activities of the Government: The State Plan-

ning Commission and the State Control Commission.

The former is responsible for the drawing up of a *New Seven-Year Development Plan* to replace the second Five-Year Plan; that with its target of not less than 600 new industries, is considered no longer able to meet the needs of the country.

TO ATTRACT INDUSTRY

In order to attract prospective businessmen and industrialists, Pioneer Status was offered to those "industries which are not being carried out in Ghana on a scale adequate to the economic needs of the country and for which the Government considers there are favorable prospects for further development."¹³ Pioneer Status gives the following advantages:

- Tax Holiday during a maximum period of five years, prolongable to 10 years;
- Custom duty relief for raw materials that are not produced in Ghana;
- Net losses incurred during the tax holiday period can be carried forward and set against past pioneer status projects within the time limit laid down by the Ordinance (as far as I know unaltered at 15 years).

It is forbidden for Ghanaians to be nominees of sleeping partners representing foreign interests, even in small-scale enterprises. Since 1962 there has been no room in Ghana for overseas interests in the small-scale enterprises sector. Foreign concerns, already established, will be allowed to continue operation, but not to expand in other fields.

From 1957 to 1960 the Ghana government was trying to create and support an independent, commercial class. I had the privilege of working for nearly a year with one of the few Ghanaian importers. He, and many others, however, have disappointed the Ghanaian ministers and are partly responsible for the current state participation in business and industry. More business training is absolutely necessary. The creation of the State Trading Corporation may be seen in this light. It began its operation in December, 1961, as a competitor of the private companies. Doctrinaire socialists may have a chance to prove that state trading is more

¹³ "Industrial Promotion in Ghana," Ministry of Trade and Industries, Accra, September 1958, p. 4.

efficient because its greater centralization utilizes more efficiently the scarce number of trained businessmen available. The problem will certainly be the lack of business incentives.

STATE FARMS

Cocoa is known in Ghana as the "lazy man's crop" because it is easy to run a cocoa farm and it returns a good profit. The planter need only plant the trees, even without clearing the bush—because cocoa needs shadow—and then wait till the pods can be harvested. Formerly, sometimes the government did the spraying; if a tree was diseased, the planter just cut it out. The government paid for the new tree, plus some extra money for the four years the planter waited for the new tree to become productive. In view of the need for diversification of the Ghanaian agriculture and because of recent overproduction in the world cocoa sector, the latter practices have recently been discontinued. The ease of making a living on a cocoa farm certainly handicaps efforts to diversify Ghana's agriculture.

An agreement has already been signed with Russia for help in the establishment of State farms for rice, maize and large-scale cotton growing. A new organization known as the Ghana State Farms Corporation will be created, responsible for the establishment of more State farms.¹⁴ Canada is to assist Ghana in setting up a farming cooperative institute in the Northern Region.

Labor conditions in agriculture are still very primitive, therefore special stress will be put in the coming years on mechanization, even of the privately owned and operated farms.

CONCLUSION

Ghana's economy is still a one-crop economy based on cocoa. The cocoa farmers are a wealthy and numerous group in the country. Together with the independent diamond diggers they form a conservative element in Ghanaian politics. Small farmers and busi-

nessmen are conservative all over the world. Although a great deal is accomplished in the industrial field and although industrialization is stressed at the moment, cocoa farming and agriculture in general will remain the major activity for the country. Education is still required to make the Ghanaians good farmers of all other agricultural products outside of cocoa.

Import restrictions and the compulsory savings plan of the government have brought for the first time a real challenge to Nkrumah's popularity. His regime is certainly passing through one of its major crises. The first effects of the Volta River scheme may soon be felt. This may bring a counterbalance for the growing discontent among laborers, petty traders and investors.

The present direction of Ghana's international trade makes it belong to the Western trade hemisphere. It is understandable that a serious effort is being made to shift the direction of trade more Eastwards, because Ghana wishes to be less dependent on the West.

In the ideological world Ghana is still democratic, if democracy means the rule of the majority, and that is its major meaning in an African environment. If democracy must include also the Western concepts of extreme respect for the individual and for small minorities, then Ghana has a long way to go.

Ghana's economic experiments have taken it further in the direction of socialism. Labor legislation is even at the fringe of a Communist bias. It should be realized, however, that Ghanaian tradition would go a very long way in the same direction, even if words like communism and socialism and states like Russia and China did not exist.

Adhemar Byl served in the field of research and practical sales for an African firm in Ghana for one year, after completing his studies at the University of Louvain. He has published articles in Belgium in both Dutch and French, and is now working on a study of labor problems in West Africa.

¹⁴ "Africa Digest," August, 1962, p. 30.

United Nations Plan for the Congo

On August 20, 1962, the United Nations issued a report on the situation in the Congo, with recommendations for a reconciliation between the Central Government and the provincial government of Katanga. Acting Secretary General U Thant, noting that it was "possible to suggest a general basis for reconciliation," summarized the proposals. The United Nations plan was accepted "in principle" by Katanga leader Moise Tshombe on September 4, 1962. Excerpts from U Thant's statement follow:

* * *

I am instructing my representative in Leopoldville, Robert Gardiner, to present a program of measures to Prime Minister Adoula and with his agreement, to provincial President Tshombe. These measures have my full support. The main elements of the program are set forth in the following paragraphs:

A Constitution for a Federal system of government in the Congo is now in preparation and all provincial governments and interested political groups have been invited to submit their views. The United Nations on request of the Government of the Congo, is assisting this process by making available international experts in Federal constitutional law. It is my hope that work on a draft constitution will be completed in 30 days.

A new law is needed to establish definitive arrangements for the division of revenues between the Central and provincial governments as well as regulations and procedures for the utilization of foreign exchange. The Central Government should submit such new law to Parliament only after consultations with provincial governments.

Until that process is completed, the Central Government and the provincial authorities of Katanga should agree [a] to share on a fifty-fifty basis revenues from all taxes and duties on exports and imports and all royalties from mining concessions; and [b] to pay to the monetary council or institution designated by it which is acceptable to the parties concerned

all foreign exchange earned by any part of the Congo.

The monetary council should control the utilization of all foreign exchange and make available for the essential needs of Katanga at least 50 per cent of the foreign exchange generated in that province.

The Central Government should request assistance from the I.M.F. [International Monetary Fund] in working out a national plan of currency unification and put such a plan into effect in the shortest possible time.

Rapid integration and unification of the entire Congolese Army is essential. A three-member commission of representatives from the Central Government, Katanga Province and the United Nations should prepare within 30 days a plan to bring this about. Two months thereafter should be adequate to put the plan into effect.

Only the Central Government should maintain Government offices or representation abroad.

As an essential aspect of national reconciliation, the Central Government should be reconstituted to provide representation for all political and provincial groups. It is noted that Prime Minister Adoula has already made certain specific offers in this regard.

Reconciliation should be served by a general amnesty for political prisoners. In addition, all Congolese authorities, national, state and local, should cooperate fully with the

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BOOK REVIEWS

AFRICAN BOOKS . . .

PAN-AFRICANISM. A SHORT POLITICAL GUIDE. BY COLIN LEGUM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 296 pages, appendices and index, \$5.75.)

Tracing the growth of Pan-Africanism from the first Pan-African conference in London in 1900, Colin Legum declares that "the emotional impetus for its [Pan-Africanist] concepts flowed from the experiences of a widely-dispersed people—those of African stock—who felt themselves . . . to have lost their homeland. . . ."

Pan-Africanism, according to the author, can help meet Africa's primary problem, "disunity" and diversity. To solve this problem, Africa ". . . will need a Pan-African movement capable of creating a framework of unity. . . ." This informative book ends with the question: Will Pan-Africanism still have strong appeal when the struggle to end colonialism is over?

LET MY PEOPLE GO. BY ALBERT LUTHULI. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. 256 pages, appendices and index, \$5.50.)

The autobiography of Chief Albert Luthuli, Nobel Peace Prize-winner, deals primarily with his efforts and those of the African National Congress to resist apartheid. His story is a personal account of South Africa's racial policies as they affect his life and his people.

Luthuli discusses the "patient endurance" of the black South Africans confronted with the growing mass of repressive measures from South Africa's white supremacist governments. Despite the imperviousness of the Malan-Strijdom-Verwoerd governments, he reaffirms "the non-Violent Passive Resistance technique in fighting for freedom" which has been adopted by the A.N.C.

THE LONELY AFRICAN. BY COLIN M. TURNBULL. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962. 251 pages, \$4.50.)

Analyzing the problem of detribalization and its impact on Africa's people and ways of life, this author points out that tribal life may provide a practical answer for Africans. Although a tribe is "too small a unit to survive alone in the modern economic and political world . . . its existence does not in any way militate against a broader nationalism."

This effective study combines analyses of the problem of the de-tribalized African and his adjustment to modern economic and political life with several chapters that are sensitive biographies of Africans who have felt the force of the white man and his civilization.

TOM MBOYA. YOUNG MAN OF NEW AFRICA. BY ALAN RAKE. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1962. 264 pages, appendix, glossary, \$4.50.)

A brilliant politician and hypnotic platform speaker, Tom Mboya at the age of 32 already has been twice elected to the Kenya legislative council. The author, a journalist, observes that Mboya's involvement in politics evolved from necessity: Mboya "arrived at the right moment in Kenya's history."

* * *

GUIDE TO SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHING. BY LEONARD S. KENWORTHY. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1962. 393 pages and index, \$4.95, text edition.)

This guide to social studies methods is designed to emphasize practical materials, and to relate these materials to the classroom situation. Mr. Kenworthy has made a valuable contribution to the teaching of the social studies.

—T.H.B.

NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT

Continued from page 328

annual investment rate about twice the maximum private foreign investment rate of approximately £20 million reached in 1960. Hence it may be seen that the Nigerian government expects to make a major effort under its development plan to induce overseas investment.

The Nigerian Development Plan reflects the society for which it was drawn and this is one of its chief assets. If the plan is substantially fulfilled, and the outlook is promising, then the fibre of Nigerian society should be strengthened and the prospects of the country for a leading role in African affairs, and beyond, an important role in world affairs, should be significantly enhanced.⁶

⁶ I have drawn freely in drafting this paper on my testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cited above in footnote 4, and on relevant portions of my forthcoming book, *The African Presence in World Affairs*.

SOUTH AFRICA

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There have been suggestions that the Transkei and Basutoland, with similar economic problems, would profit by joining in a larger autonomous state, possibly under the joint protection of South Africa and Great Britain. However, such a merger might only double economic problems; and the Basuto and Xosa have different languages and no tradition of cooperation. The future for both territories is murky.

Meanwhile the problems of a multi-racial society with different cultural levels overshadow everything else in South Africa. Even while the government has "banned" such intellectuals as Alan Paton and Patrick Duncan of the European group and has driven such Bantu leaders as Z. K. Matthews to the traditional refuge of Geneva, Bantu living standards continue to rise. The government has recently modified the liquor laws so that under certain conditions Bantu may drink the same products as Europeans, although not

with them. Bantu retail and wholesale business has increased, thanks to loans from the private Bantu Development Corporation; and Sabikor has launched a weekly (soon to be daily) in the major Bantu languages.

The National Theatre Organization has established a Bantu group, which with European cooperation produced the musical *King Kong*. This took London by storm and demonstrated that there is more to Bantu life in the locations outside cities than just terror and apartheid.

The fact is simply that Bantu wages and real income have been rising ever-more sharply since the victory of the Nationalists in 1948, whether because, despite, or indifferently of their policies is difficult to say. But without doubt, as Eric Louw told the furious Afro-Asian members of the 1962 United Nations General Assembly, non-Europeans live better in South Africa than in any other place in Africa or Asia. The question for the Republic of South Africa is whether they will be content forever to live by bread alone.

CONGO

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interpose strong objections. It is apparent that the Russians were following developments very closely. In early August they appointed an ambassador to Leopoldville, the first since the Communists had been expelled in the fall of 1960. In a strong note to U Thant the Russians condemned the new plan for the Congo and submitted one of their own despite their two-year refusal to assume any of the costs of United Nations operations in the Congo. The Soviet note described the American-made plan as the product of gangsters working in collusion, a new conspiracy against the Congo Republic, which sought to prevent the unification of the land by weakening the Congolese government and by strengthening Tshombe.

The Soviet Union recommended, instead, that the United Nations suspend all relations with the separatists of Katanga and give

them no aid whatsoever; that foreign military personnel and advisers of Tshombe be arrested and expelled; that the United Nations assist the Congolese government in establishing effective control of foreign monopolies and force them to pay taxes to the government in Leopoldville. This open opposition of the Soviet Union to United Nations policy reminds one of the situation that existed two years earlier.

There were other objectors to the latest United Nations plan. Nkrumah of Ghana, who had given free advice to Lumumba in 1960, now urged Adoula against adopting a federal system for the Congo because only a strong unitary state can cope with the problems faced in Africa. In the United States, where both the *Union Minière* and Katanga have active agents to represent their point of view, the United Nations plan has been attacked by Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut on the Senate floor. His views were supported in general by the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters. It is asserted that both Portugal and Rhodesia are ready to give help to Katanga against Adoula, who has offended the former by permitting Angolan rebels to have a military training camp in Congolese territory. Furthermore, Tshombe needs the railway through Portuguese territory in Africa for the shipment of Katanga minerals to the outside world.

At this writing, although President Moïse Tshombe has accepted in principle the new program, nothing has been accomplished toward its implementation, and the United States and the United Nations are still where they were when Adoula and Tshombe broke off their talks at the end of June.

DISSOLVING FEDERATION

Continued from page 345

Central Africa will become a vortex of chaos and violence indeed. This vortex may well finally engulf the United Nations organization itself, and lead to international and inter-continental conflict. We appear to be witnessing a three-act drama. The Congo crisis

of 1960 constituted the first act. The Central African crisis, now imminent, will constitute the second act. The third and last act will be played out in South Africa. Yet it would appear that the final outcome will be determined not at the end of the play, but by events during the second act. In other words, there is still time for forces to be set in motion to work against the forces of hate and destruction. Immediately, however, responsibility for the future course of events lies with the United Kingdom.

BRAZZAVILLE TWELVE

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(4) The last notable change of emphasis in development discussions has been toward greater recognition of our ignorance of African conditions and greater concern for technical research. On all sides, there has been recognition that Africa should not attempt to imitate Europe's or America's economic development, but must find some new path of its own. For this reason, surprisingly large portions of development funds have been going into research. ☺

AFRICAN ECOLOGY

This is as it should be, for we still know very little about Africa and especially about African ecology. For example, we know five ways to replenish the fertility (or at least the nitrogen) of agricultural soil: (1) by fallowing, (2) by alluvial flooding (3) by chemical fertilizers (4) by use of animal manures and (5) by use of leguminous plants. The traditional African way has been the first, except in Egypt, which has always used the second; the United States uses the third increasingly, while Europe has tended to use the fourth and fifth, usually in combination. Africa cannot use the third because of the expense and must give up the first because of the pressure of population on the soil. The fourth is hampered by lack of fodder, the prevalence of tsetse fly and animal diseases, and the damaging effects of great heat on domestic animals. But there are many Af-

rican leguminous crops of which we know little, including those which were used in East and Northeast African aboriginal agriculture. Research on the use of these and of alluvial flooding are urgently needed.

The four shifts of emphasis in African development thinking came about from the pressure of conditions, such as lack of capital, lack of technical training, the pressure of under-employment, the precarious state of world commodity markets and other conditions. There can be little doubt that, in the short run at least, these shifts of emphasis will be a good thing. In the long run, however, the ultimate nature of the African economy seems more puzzling and more remote than ever. What will it be like?

One thing seems increasingly clear and that is that the future African economy will not be an imitation of the nineteenth century English system of factory towns built on coal and iron nor will it be an imitation of American suburbia based on expensive electric grids, the internal combustion engine, and stainless steel. Since it will have to be constructed on those things which Africa has, it may have to be based on decentralized sunlight energy converters, cellulose and sand used to make plastics and fiber glass, extensive reuse of water, a chemical industry, including light metals, based on sun energy electrolysis of local ores and waters, and a labor consuming food production system based increasingly on African plants, animals, and fish. At present, this future economy is seen only dimly, but French-speaking Africa is doing more than its share in the effort to achieve it.

EAST AFRICA

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their shipping and all three using the ports on Lake Victoria for transportation.

In the past the only college in this area has been Makerere College in Uganda, to which students from all three areas have gone. Now the three regions have combined to form the University of East Africa, with

separate parts of it in Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala.

Economically the nations are fairly similar. Each of them is primarily agricultural and the crops they grow are almost identical, but their mineral products are different.

Whether they like to admit it or not, their common experience with the rule of the British has given them much in common, too.

But above all is their common experience for 14 years of inter-territorial cooperation in the East Africa High Commission (called the East Africa Common Services Authority since the independence of Tanganyika). They have had common postal services and telecommunications, customs and excise taxes, income taxes, railways and harbors, statistics and research, and publications and health services.

Kenya and Tanganyika have pushed for a furtherance of this cooperation in some kind of loose federation; Uganda has given tacit approval. Of all the areas of Africa today, East Africa has the most promise at present of evolving a federation of some kind, economic if not political. If this possibility becomes a reality, then we can use the term "East Africa" without hesitation. Until then we can use it only cautiously.

DOCUMENT

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United Nations in its task of carrying out United Nations resolutions.

The proposed steps toward national reconciliation are fully in accord with the July 29 statement of Prime Minister Adoula. They likewise should be acceptable to Katanga and all other provinces of the Congo, judging from recent statements of Congolese leaders. Mr. Tshombe therefore should be able to indicate his acceptance promptly.

The United Nations, of course, stands ready to give all possible assistance in their implementation. I urge member governments to support these approaches by urging Congolese of all sectors and views to accept them forthwith. * * *

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of October, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

- Oct. 5—West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt leaves Washington after a week's talks with U.S. officials.
- Oct. 6—East German guards shoot a 21-year-old West Berliner helping two East Germans to escape. The East German guards refuse to allow a British military ambulance to cross into East Berlin to provide medical care.
- Oct. 9—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declares, in a speech before the West German parliament, that West Germany will not take any initiative on the Berlin situation while the U.S.S.R. insists on a divided Germany and a subjugated Berlin.
- Oct. 12—The West German parliament ends a 15-hour debate on the German question; a resolution urging a permanent four power conference on the German question is approved.
- Oct. 15—In Washington, West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder meets with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to discuss the Berlin question.
- Oct. 22—East German police tighten their check of civilian traffic going from West Berlin to West Germany. Over 100 trucks are delayed at the crossing point from West Berlin onto the Autobahn.

Cuban Crisis

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

Disarmament

- Oct. 19—Thirty non-nuclear nations ask the General Assembly to call on nations with nuclear weapons to cease all testing by Jan-

uary 1, 1963. No provisions for control of inspection are proposed.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

- Oct. 24—The E.E.C. and 18 independent African nations agree on terms of African association with the Common Market, to take effect early in 1963.
- Greece becomes an associate member of the Common Market.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

- Oct. 29—Nato decides to keep General Lauris Norstad as Nato's Commander in Chief 2 months more because of the Cuban dispute.

Organization of American States (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

- Oct. 23—The O.A.S. authorizes the U.S. quarantine of Cuba.
- Oct. 24—Latin American nations including Argentina and Costa Rica offer military aid to the United States.

United Nations

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

- Oct. 8—Algeria is admitted as the 109th member of the United Nations.
- Oct. 9—It is reported at the U.N. that 66 U.S. satellite launchings have been reported to the U.N. Space Registry.
- Oct. 15—The Security Council approves the admission of Uganda as the 110th member of the U.N. The General Assembly is expected to approve.
- Oct. 16—87 nations promise \$116 million for U.N. technical assistance programs in 1963.
- Oct. 17—The General Assembly elects Brazil, Morocco, Norway and the Philippines as

nonpermanent members of the Security Council replacing Chile, the U.A.R., Ireland and Rumania January 1, 1963.

Oct. 19—The U.S. asks the General Assembly to criticize South Africa's racist policies which could lead to "bloodshed, war and disaster. . . ."

Indonesia and the Netherlands agree to the appointment of Iranian Djalal Abdoh as U.N. administrator for West New Guinea.

Oct. 22—U.S. delegate Adlai Stevenson charges that Communist China's aggression against India proves her unfit for U.N. membership.

Oct. 26—India tells the U.N. General Assembly that Communist China should be admitted to the U.N. and held responsible for her aggression.

Oct. 30—The General Assembly rejects a Soviet motion to replace Nationalist China with Communist China in the U.N. The vote is 56 to 42.

ALGERIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

Oct. 8—Algeria is admitted to membership in the U.N. The General Assembly's vote of approval makes her the 109th member.

Oct. 17—After a 24-hour visit to Havana, Algerian Premier Ahmed Ben Bella returns to New York. A communiqué is released following the talks between Premier Fidel Castro and the Algerian Premier calling for the return of Cuban territory and the evacuation of military bases around the world, including the U.S. base at Guantanamo.

Oct. 20—Ben Bella returns to Algeria.

ARGENTINA

Oct. 16—President José María Guido's government announces that elections will be held in March and June, 1963, and that a new government will take office in October, 1963.

BELGIUM

Oct. 14—Violence erupts in Brussels when Flemish-speaking Belgians demonstrate against denial of their cultural and political

equality by the Walloon (French-speaking) community. Some 19 persons are injured. The Flemings demand that the French language be replaced by Dutch as the language of business.

BRAZIL

Oct. 7—Elections for Congress, 11 state governors, 22 state assemblies, and mayors and municipal councils in 16 states are held. The congressional elections involve 45 Senate seats and all 409 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Oct. 26—Final returns announced today for the governorship of Sao Paulo State disclose that Adhemar de Barros has defeated ex-President Janio Quadros.

Oct. 27—In the state of Pernambuco, final tallies show that the Communist-supported candidate Miguel Arraes de Alencar is victorious. Final, official returns on the other elections are not yet available.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

Oct. 3—The Social Credit party's no confidence motion is "overwhelmingly defeated" in Parliament, in effect giving a vote of confidence to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's Conservative minority government.

Oct. 4—The Conservatives survive two further votes of no confidence.

Oct. 9—Social Credit party support enables the Diefenbaker government to survive a Liberal party motion of no confidence.

Ghana

Oct. 2—President Kwame Nkrumah links foreign enemies with a recent effort to assassinate him.

Great Britain

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

Oct. 27—The Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Home, declares that the first move for peaceful settlement of the Cuban dispute must be the dismantling of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba.

India

(See also *China*.)

- Oct. 12—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru orders the Indian Army to drive the Chinese Communists out of Indian territory. Frontier fighting subsides temporarily.
- Oct. 20—Heavy fighting begins on the western and eastern sectors of the Himalayan frontier between China and India.
- Oct. 22—Nehru rallies the Indian people. The Chinese open a third front near the Burmese border.
- Oct. 26—President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan declares a state of emergency in India.
- Oct. 27—It is revealed in New Delhi that Britain is flying arms to India.
- Oct. 29—Nehru asks the U.S. for military assistance. India has already suffered 2,000-2,500 casualties.
- Oct. 30—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan pledges aid to India against Communist China's "brutal and ruthless" pressure.
- Oct. 31—Nehru ousts Minister of Defense V. K. Krishna Menon and assumes personal direction of India's armed forces. Menon is named Minister of Defense Production.

Uganda

- Oct. 9—Uganda becomes the 16th member of the British Commonwealth. Prime Minister Milton Obote refuses to recognize South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He also criticizes Portugal's racial policies.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

- Oct. 23—A constitutional conference opens in London; a date for independence may be set.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

- Oct. 14—The formation of the People's Independent Democratic Union, a new African political party, is announced in Southern Rhodesia.
- Oct. 27—The Government of Southern Rhod-

esia announces that the general election will be held on December 14.

- Oct. 29—Elections are held for the 44 of the 45 seats in Northern Rhodesia's Legislative Council.
- Oct. 31—Early returns in northern Rhodesia's election fail to give Roy Welensky's United Federal Party or the African National Congress a clear majority.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *British Commonwealth, India*.)

- Oct. 21—Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon announces that Indian troops in the North East Frontier Agency have been pushed back by Chinese Communist attackers. The N.E.F.A. is in the area under dispute, i.e., directly south of the McMahon line separating India and Tibet.
- Oct. 31—Communist Chinese newspapers carry stories and editorials criticizing the U.S. action against Cuba and criticizing the U.S.S.R. for retreating before the U.S. blockade.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

- Oct. 2—Central government troops are sent into South Kasai province following a short-lived revolt. South Kasai's secessionist leader Albert Kalonji is under house arrest. Kalonji escaped last month from a government prison.
- Oct. 9—In a report by Robert K. A. Gardiner, head of the U.N.'s Congo operation, it is revealed that in secessionist Katanga Province, the number of mercenaries has reached 300-500 men. He also reports an increase in Katanga's air strength.
- Oct. 15—Premier Cyrille Adoula announces a new constitution for the Congo providing for local autonomy with federal control over the army, finance and foreign policy.
- Oct. 20—Fighting breaks out between central government forces and secessionist Katanga troops.
- Oct. 21—U.N. Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph J. Bunche leaves for the Congo.

CUBA

(See also *U.S.S.R. and U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

Oct. 8—Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado at the U.N. General Assembly asks for condemnation of the U.S. intention to set up a shipping blockade of Cuba, to become effective in about 2 weeks.

Sources report that a New York lawyer, James B. Donovan, will meet tomorrow with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro to negotiate the release of the 1,113 prisoners captured during the April, 1961, invasion. Donovan represents the Cuban Families Committee.

Oct. 10—It is reported that the U.S. government will help pay the \$60 million ransom set by Castro for the 1,113 Cuban prisoners.

Donovan and Castro meet to discuss the prisoners' release.

Oct. 16—Algerian Premier Ahmed Ben Bella arrives in Cuba for a 24-hour visit.

Oct. 22—Following U.S. President John F. Kennedy's arms quarantine of Cuba, Cuba orders its armed forces on alert.

Oct. 28—Premier Castro demands that the U.S. give up its naval base at Guantanamo.

FRANCE

Oct. 2—The National Assembly meets after its summer recess. A motion of censure against President Charles de Gaulle's government is introduced because of parliamentary disapproval of the referendum of October 28. De Gaulle plans to have the French people vote on a constitutional amendment to provide for popular election of the president. The French president is now chosen by an electoral college of 80,000 "notables." De Gaulle has by-passed the constitutional procedure of consulting parliament first on the amendment, and is putting the constitutional referendum directly before the voters.

Oct. 5—The National Assembly in a vote of censure (280 of the 480 members vote for censure) overthrows the government of Premier Georges Pompidou.

De Gaulle, in eastern France, attends the opening of the most extensive military training maneuvers since 1938.

Oct. 6—Premier Pompidou formally resigns. De Gaulle asks him to remain in office until a new National Assembly is elected. De Gaulle announces that the National Assembly will be dissolved shortly, and elections scheduled for November.

Oct. 18—On the fourth day of campaigning on the presidential election referendum, de Gaulle reaffirms his threat to resign if he fails to receive the support of the people for the amendment.

Oct. 20—Reliable sources report that France, in a memorandum to West Germany, has suggested that the 2 countries coordinate their efforts within the international organizations they belong to, presumably in the Common Market and Nato.

Oct. 28—French voters cast ballots on the referendum to amend the constitution and provide for direct election of the president.

Oct. 29—It is announced that President de Gaulle has received the support of a plurality of registered voters, but not an absolute majority. Some 62 per cent of the valid votes cast (more than 20 million) approved the constitutional amendment for popular election of the president.

Oct. 31—De Gaulle states that he is satisfied with the vote in support of his constitutional amendment.

**GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF (EAST)**

Oct. 15—Polish First Secretary of the Workers' (Communist) party Wladyslaw Gomułka arrives in East Berlin.

**GERMANY, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF (WEST)**

(See *Int'l, Berlin, and France.*)

Oct. 31—Minister of Justice Wolfgang Stammberger (Free Democrat) resigns. The Free Democratic party leaders meet to decide whether the other 4 Free Democratic Cabinet members in the coalition government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer should also resign.

GUINEA

Oct. 10—President of Guinea Sékou Touré talks with U.S. President Kennedy in

Washington. Touré later declares that he has asked for increased U.S. aid.

HAITI

Oct. 8—President Francois Duvalier reshuffles his cabinet.

INDONESIA

Oct. 1—The Netherlands' sovereignty over the territory of West New Guinea ends. The temporary, 7-month U.N. jurisdiction over West New Guinea begins. On May 1, 1963, control will be handed to Indonesia.

ISRAEL

Oct. 30—The Knesset (parliament) re-elects President Itzhak Ben-Zvi for his third 5-year term.

LAOS

Oct. 5—The last U.S. military advisers withdraw from Vientiane to meet tomorrow's deadline for the evacuation of all foreign soldiers.

Oct. 6—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk confers with 7 ministers representing U.N. members in New York. They discuss whether the removal of Communist forces in Laos has actually taken place.

Oct. 10—Spokesman for the U.S. State Department Lincoln White announces that yesterday the U.S. asked the International Control Commission for Laos to determine whether or not North Vietnamese soldiers have withdrawn from Laos.

LEBANON

Oct. 26—The Lebanese ship, the *Marucla*, is halted by U.S. naval vessels blockading Cuba. Under charter to the Soviet Union, the *Marucla* is carrying Soviet cargo to Cuba.

NETHERLANDS, THE

(See *Indonesia*.)

POLAND

Oct. 17—U.S. Ambassador to Poland John Moors Cabot attends a meeting in Radom to which he had been invited by the local

Communist party newspaper and the Lightning Discussion Club. In a rare encounter for a U.S. Ambassador behind the Iron Curtain, Cabot frankly answers questions posed by the 400-man audience.

SAUDI ARABIA

Oct. 17—In a broadcast from Mecca, it is reported that King Saud has dissolved his Cabinet. He appoints Prince Faisal premier.

SOUTH AFRICA

Oct. 26—It is announced that beginning February 1, 1963, all whites, coloreds and Asians over 16 years old will be required to carry identity cards. Heretofore, cards have been compulsory only for blacks.

TURKEY

Oct. 18—Some 258 political prisoners, followers of ex-Premier Adnan Menderes, are released under an amnesty.

Oct. 29—Turkey celebrates her 39th year as a republic.

U.S.S.R., THE

Oct. 2—It is disclosed that the Soviet Union has cancelled its agreement to set up an exhibition at the New York World's Fair in 1964-1965.

Oct. 4—A joint communiqué is issued by President Tito and visiting Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev at the end of Brezhnev's visit. The communiqué calls for industrial cooperation and for increased trade between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. (See also *Yugoslavia*.)

Oct. 7—It is disclosed that reports of riots in June in the industrial city of Novocherkassk are being pieced together. The unrest is believed to have resulted from meat and butter price increases in June.

Oct. 10—The Warsaw Pact forces are reported to have ended annual fall training maneuvers yesterday.

Oct. 13—A basic revision of the Soviet economy is reported. An incentive system to stimulate greater production at less cost is under discussion.

Oct. 16—Meeting with the new U.S. Am-

- bassador, Foy D. Kohler, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev asks for serious negotiations to end the Berlin crisis.
- Oct. 17—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) reports that the Soviet Union has successfully fired 2 multi-stage rockets 7,500 miles into the Central Pacific yesterday and today.
- Oct. 21—In an interview of September 18 published in West Germany, by a former Belgian official, Khrushchev declares that if talks with the U.S. on a Berlin settlement after the American elections in November are unsuccessful, he will present the Berlin question to the U.N.
- Oct. 22—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission reports 2 Russian nuclear tests.
- Oct. 28—Following a week of tension, Soviet Premier Khrushchev agrees unconditionally to dismantle rocket bases in Cuba. (See *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)
- Oct. 29—General Pavel I. Batov is named chief of staff of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.
- Oct. 30—Czech President Antonin Novotny arrives for talks in Moscow.
- Oct. 31—A First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, is ordered to Cuba by Premier Khrushchev, following Cuban Premier Castro's demand that the U.S. give up its Guantanamo naval base. (See also *Cuba*.)

UNITED STATES

The Economy

- Oct. 18—The Federal Reserve Board announces that more credit is being made available to prospective borrowers; commercial banks are now required to hold only 4 per cent of their savings and time deposits in reserve; for the past 8 years, banks have been required to hold 5 per cent in reserve.
- Oct. 22—The stock market reflects the Cuban crisis; stock prices drop sharply.
- Oct. 31—The Labor Department reports unemployment at a 3-year low, 5.5 per cent of the labor force.

Foreign Policy

- Oct. 13—It is announced in Washington that West German Chancellor Konrad Ade-

nauer will visit President Kennedy November 7; the visit was originally planned for the spring of 1963.

- Oct. 15—Algerian Premier Ahmed Ben Bella arrives in Washington for a state visit.
- Oct. 17—It is revealed in Washington that in conversations with United States Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev has discussed a visit to the U.N. and to President Kennedy "soon."
- Oct. 18—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko discusses the Berlin impasse with President Kennedy.
- Oct. 20—The President cancels part of a 3-day campaign trip and returns to Washington with a "cold."
- Oct. 22—President Kennedy, in a nationwide address, tells the American people that the U.S.S.R. is building long-range offensive missile bases in Cuba; the President imposes an arms "quarantine" on Cuba and demands the removal of the missile bases.
- Congressional leaders return to Washington at the President's request for a briefing on the Cuban crisis.

The U.S. asks the Security Council to meet at once to discuss the Cuban crisis.

- Oct. 23—The United States Navy prepares for the Cuban blockade, ordered into effect by Executive Order at 10 A.M. October 24. United States military units have been ordered to use force if necessary to prevent the shipment of arms into Cuba. U.S. photographs of the new missile bases are published.

Air patrol planes are watching 25 Soviet merchant ships en route to Cuba; their courses are reported "unchanged."

The Soviet Union warns that the U.S. is risking nuclear war and denies that the U.S. can impose an arms blockade on Cuba. Missile bases in Cuba are said to be solely for Cuban defense.

The Organization of American States votes 19 to 0 to authorize "the use of armed force" to prevent further Soviet arms shipments into Cuba.

The United Nations Security Council begins discussion of the United States quarantine of Cuba.

Oct. 24—The U.S. blockade of Cuba becomes effective.

George Woods is named to succeed Eugene Black as president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

In a letter to British philosopher Lord Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev suggests a summit meeting to discuss the Cuban question; Khrushchev will not make any "reckless decisions."

U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant asks President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to agree to a 2 or 3 week "suspension" of action with regard to Cuba to provide time to resolve the crisis "peacefully and normalize the situation in the Caribbean."

Oct. 25—Khrushchev accepts U Thant's proposal; Kennedy agrees to discuss the possibility of negotiation; the blockade will continue until arrangements for negotiation are completed. The United States again demands the removal of the new bases.

The Department of Defense reports "potential fallout shelter spaces" for 60 million persons; "local civil defense directors know where the space is."

The State Department reveals that discussions of economic aid for Algeria have been suspended indefinitely supposedly because of Ben Bella's visit to Cuba. (See also *Cuba* and *Algeria*.)

A Soviet oil tanker is stopped by United States blockade forces and permitted to continue toward Cuba after it is "ascertained" that the tanker carries only petroleum; no search is made. It is reported that 12 Soviet ships have apparently changed course, presumably because they carry war materials for Cuba.

Oct. 26—The White House publishes reports showing the continuing construction of missile bases in Cuba.

In reply to a new appeal from U Thant, the U.S.S.R. agrees to keep its ships away from the U.S. blockade area; the U.S. promises to try to avoid a direct confrontation "in the next few days."

The Navy searches a Soviet-chartered

freighter and permits her to continue to Havana, finding no offensive weapons aboard.

The President's trip to Brazil (scheduled for November) is postponed because of the Cuban crisis.

Oct. 27—Premier Khrushchev offers to withdraw offensive weapons and dismantle Cuban bases if the U.S. will take similar action in Turkey. President Kennedy refuses to discuss Turkish bases; he urges Khrushchev to return to the offer he made privately to Kennedy last evening, to dismantle the bases under U.N. supervision.

The Defense Department announces that 24 troop carrier air squadrons have been called to active duty; a U-2 plane is missing and presumed lost over Cuba and other unarmed planes have been fired upon.

Adlai Stevenson tells the Western allies that the U.S. will soon take military action in Cuba unless work on the missile bases stops.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro invites U Thant to Cuba.

Oct. 28—Khrushchev promises to stop work on Soviet bases in Cuba, dismantle the weapons under U.N. surveillance and take them back to the U.S.S.R. Kennedy pledges that the U.S. will not invade Cuba; the Cuban blockade will be lifted when the U.N. has taken "necessary measures."

U Thant announces plans to fly to Cuba October 29 to discuss arrangements for U.N. surveillance of the Soviet dismantling of the missile bases.

President Kennedy apologizes to Khrushchev because a U.S. plane has flown over Russian territory due to a navigational error.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro asks the U.S. to evacuate its naval base at Guantanamo. (See also *Cuba* and *U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 29—Thant has what is termed "fruitful" talks with Russian and U.S. envoys about the Cuban crisis.

Oct. 30—U Thant begins talks in Havana.

The U.S. temporarily lifts the Cuban blockade as a courtesy to U Thant. Air surveillance is suspended.

Oct. 31—U Thant returns to the U.N.; he is "reliably informed" that Soviet abandonment of Cuban missiles is in progress. Conversations with Castro, he says, were "fruitful."

Government

Oct. 4—Congress completes action on an over-all revision of conflict of interest legislation for federal employees.

President Kennedy names 13 members of a private satellite communications corporation under government control to set up the corporation's procedure and arrange for public sale of stock.

Oct. 9—The Columbia Basin Interstate Compact is signed by delegates from Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada and Utah. Ratification by Congress and the state legislatures of Washington, Idaho, Oregon and Montana is necessary.

The President signs a bill authorizing a \$10 million aquarium on the Potomac.

Oct. 10—The President signs legislation allowing self-employed persons to take tax deductions on income invested in private pension plans.

The President signs legislation providing more adequate federal control over new drugs released to the American consumer.

Oct. 11—President Kennedy signs a bill authorizing postal rate rises, and federal pay increases.

The President also signs the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, giving him the power to reduce tariffs as much as 50 per cent and creating a program of "adjustment-assistance" aid for industries and workers who suffer from competition with increased imports.

Oct. 13—The 87th Congress adjourns after its longest session since the 1951 Korean War session.

Oct. 16—Kennedy signs a tax revision bill; the legislation provides investment credit, curbs expense account deductions for entertainment, raises taxes on savings and loans associations, puts a ceiling on tax-exempt income of persons living abroad and tight-

ens up on overseas business profits. The new law does not provide for tax withholding on dividends and interest.

Oct. 17—The President signs legislation repealing the requirement that college students and scientists seeking federal loans or grants must file a non-Communist disclaimer affidavit.

Oct. 19—The President signs legislation providing tighter controls on interstate shipment of gambling devices except to states which allow their use.

Oct. 23—President Kennedy signs the \$3.9 billion foreign aid bill, 20 per cent less than he had asked. A clause bans aid for 18 Communist nations; under certain conditions the President may waive these restrictions. Aid for countries shipping arms to Castro's Cuba is also forbidden.

Oct. 25—White House aides reveal that no new public functions are being planned; two have been cancelled because of the Cuban crisis.

The Senate subcommittee investigating charges that military leaders are being "muzzled" in public discussions issues a final report concluding that prior clearance of officers' speeches is "necessary and desirable in the best interests of the nation."

Labor

Oct. 4—Federal District Court Judge J. F. X. McGohey orders 60,000 striking longshoremen from Maine to Texas back to work.

Military Policy

Oct. 1—After being sworn in as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor gives his support to a "no cities" war strategy.

Oct. 3—Commander Walter M. Schirra, Jr., orbits the earth six times and lands safely after an almost perfect flight.

Oct. 18—A Ranger 5 moon rocket is launched; failing to get solar power, the battery fails after 8 hours, 44 minutes of flight.

Oct. 20—The U.S. fires a successful nuclear device in the upper atmosphere, the second successful shot of 1962.

Oct. 30—A special Department of Defense

advisory committee suggests major changes in instruction on communism to American servicemen.

Oct. 31—The U.S. launches its first geodetic "flashing light" satellite.

The Defense Department says that Defense Department officials may not provide news information without reporting its substance to a Pentagon press officer.

Politics

Oct. 15—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower criticizes Kennedy's "dreary foreign record of the past 21 months."

Oct. 21—Eisenhower says "current" foreign policy is not a campaign issue.

Oct. 22—The White House says that Kennedy and Vice-President Lyndon Johnson will take no further part in political campaigning because of the Cuban crisis.

Oct. 24—Kennedy orders members of his Cabinet to refrain from political campaigning during the Cuban crisis.

Oct. 27—Eisenhower urges the nation to be loyal to the President as Commander-in-Chief but attacks him on domestic issues.

Segregation

Oct. 1—Negro James H. Meredith is enrolled at the previously all-white University of Mississippi after a 15-hour riot that took two lives and injured scores of persons. More than 3,000 federal troops use tear gas and fire rifles to quell the rioting mob, protesting the enrollment of a Negro student. The University campus is occupied by federal troops to restore order.

Former Major General Edwin A. Walker is arrested for insurrection, for leading rioters against federal troops at the University of Mississippi. The federal government says that the rioting was caused by the failure of Mississippi Governor Ross R. Barnett and his aides to keep their promises to maintain order when Meredith entered the University.

Oct. 6—The legislature of Mississippi decides not to continue a state investigation of the violence of September 30–October 1 at the University of Mississippi.

Oct. 9—James Meredith charges that U.S. army troops in the Oxford area have been segregated.

Oct. 11—The army announces the fourth planned withdrawal of troops from the Oxford area; 4,500 troops will be left out of a force that reached more than 23,000 at its peak.

Oct. 15—Hazel Ruth Adams, a 17-year old Negro girl, enters Patrick Henry College in Martinsville, Virginia, the first Negro to sit in a classroom with white students in southside Virginia's "black belt." Patrick Henry is a branch of the University of Virginia.

The Justice Department requests a federal court to fine Mississippi Governor Barnett \$100,000 for defying federal court orders, with an additional fine of \$10,000 daily until he purges himself of contempt charges brought on September 28.

Oct. 16—Governor Barnett denies that he has been in contempt of court.

Hazel Ruth Adams resigns from Patrick Henry College without explanation.

Oct. 19—The State of Mississippi and several of its officials are enjoined by a federal court from acting to prevent Meredith's attendance at the University of Mississippi. Action against Barnett is deferred.

Supreme Court

Oct. 1—The Supreme Court opens its fall term. Arthur Goldberg is sworn in as a new justice.

Oct. 8—The Court upholds the court order requiring the University of Mississippi to admit James Meredith. (See also *Segregation*.)

The Court agrees to review the constitutionality of public school recital of Bible verses and the Lord's Prayer.

Oct. 22—The Court rules that federal judges have authority to make state registrars place specific Negroes on their voting rolls.

VATICAN, THE

Oct. 11—Pope John XXIII opens Ecumenical Council Vatican II with 2,700 Council fathers in attendance. This is the 21st

ecumenical council, and the first since Vatican I in 1869-1870.

VENEZUELA

Oct. 8—President Romulo Betancourt announces the suspension of constitutional guarantees after a week of terrorism.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Oct. 5—Viet Cong (Communist) guerrillas attack government forces in an area 50 miles southeast of Saigon. 100 rebels are reported killed. A U.S. army sergeant in a helicopter crew is also killed.

Oct. 6—Three of the 8 American crew aboard a helicopter are killed when it crashes. Whether the craft fell accidentally or because of Viet Cong fire is not known.

Oct. 15—A U.S. Air Force L-28 spotter plane is shot down by Viet Cong rebels; 3 U.S. crewmen are killed.

Oct. 19—It is reported that Operation Morning Star, a large-scale anti-Communist offensive, was halted yesterday.

YEMEN

Oct. 2—The rebel military regime in Yemen warns Saudi Arabia against assisting a

counter-invasion by Prince Saif al-Islam al-Hassan, uncle of the deposed Imam Ahmad. Prince Hassan has set up headquarters in Saudi Arabia.

Oct. 7—The Cairo radio reports that Yemeni forces are fighting with Saudi Arabian troops along their common frontier. Saudi Arabia supports Prince Hassan's efforts to restore the monarchy.

Oct. 16—It is reported from Jordan that Prince Hassan has given up his claim in favor of the Imam. It is reported in Jordan that the supposedly assassinated Imam Ahmad has sent telegrams to all the Arab chiefs denouncing the rebellion. In the telegram received in Jordan yesterday, the Imam says he has joined with loyal tribes to put down the rebels.

Oct. 18—Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia states that the Imam Ahmad is alive.

Oct. 31—A radio broadcast reports that Premier Abdullah al-Salal has also been named president of the new Yemeni republic.

YUGOSLAVIA

Oct. 4—Soviet Chief of State (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) Leonid I. Brezhnev leaves Yugoslavia.

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